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Abstract
U.S. labor markets are increasingly diverse and persistently unequal
between genders, races/ethnicities, educational groups and age. In the
spirit of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), we use a structural model
approach to decompose the observed dierences in labor market outcomes
across demographic groups in terms of underlying wedges, or frictions.
Of particular interest is the potential role of discrimination, either taste-
based or statistical. Our prototype model is a version of the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model extended to include a life cycle, learning by
doing, a non-participation state, and informational frictions. The pro-
totype exhibits group-specic wedges in initial human capital, returns to
experience, matching eciencies, and hazard rates. We use the model to
reverse engineer group-specic wedges which we then feed back into the
model to assess the fraction of various disparities they account for. Ap-
plying this methodology to 1998-2018 U.S. data reveals that dierences in
initial human capital, returns to experience, and in hazard rates, account
for most of the demographic disparities; wedges in matching eciencies
play a secondary role. Our results suggest a minor aggregate impact of
taste-based discrimination in hiring and an important role for statistical
discrimination aecting particularly female groups and Black males. Our
approach is macro, structural, unied, and comprehensive.
JEL: E2, J6, J7
The U.S. population has grown increasingly diverse during the last 40 years,
and it is expected to become even more diverse during the next 40 years (Figure
1). At the same time, there are signicant and persistent dierences in labor
market outcomes between genders, races, and ethnicities, and those dierences
constitute an important dimension of economic inequality (Altonji & Blank
1999, Guryan and Charles 2012, Lang and Lehmann 2012, Blau and Kahn
2017, Cajner et. al. 2017). Figure 2 uses data from the Current Population
∗Iowa State University, 266 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011 (e-mail: cordoba@iastate.edu, iso-
jarvi@iastate.edu, haoranl@iastate.edu). We are grateful to numerous colleagues and seminar
participants for very helpful comments.
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Figure 1: Composition of the U.S. Population: 1980-2060 (Census and Census
Projections)
Survey (CPS) for the period 1998-2018 to illustrate some of these inequities.
The gure includes eight demographic groups and four labor market outcomes:
wages, unemployment, non-participation, and job-nding rates.1
What are the underlying sources of the observed labor market disparities
among demographic groups? To what extent could these dierences reect
discrimination? What is the potential aggregate cost of discrimination? This
paper uses macro accounting techniques, in the spirit of Chari et. al. (2007), to
address these questions. The technique introduces wedges, or frictions, into a
canonical, or prototype, frictionless model. Wedges are then calibrated so that
the model exactly matches relevant evidence. The purpose of the exercise is not
to validate the prototype. Instead, the wedges suggest dimensions along which
the prototype would need to be extended. Each calibrated wedge is then fed
back into the prototype to assess its quantitative importance in explaining the
evidence, or its individual contribution. Accounting techniques of this type are
helpful to identify the most and least promising lines of research. For example,
Chari et. al. use the standard growth model as their prototype, extend it to
include four time-varying wedges, and calibrate them to match series of output,
labor, consumption, and investment. They nd that eciency and labor wedges
accounted for most of the post-war business cycles while investment wedges
played only a minor role.
The natural prototype for our accounting exercise is the Diamond-Mortensen-
1See Section 2 for details.
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Figure 2: Selected labor markets stastics over the life cycle for dierent demo-
graphic groups (CPS: 1998-2018).
Pissarides (DMP) model. The DMP model is the canonical model of the labor
market, provides predictions for the variables of interest, wages, job-nding,
employment, and unemployment rates, and oers a unied general equilibrium
framework.2 Furthermore, the decentralized allocation is ecient under enough
segmentation and if a Hosios type of condition holds. As in Chari et. al., the
prototype can be enriched by introducing proper wedges so that a calibrated
version of the model can exactly match the relevant evidence, such as the one
portrayed in Figure 2. Our choice of the DMP model is also consistent with
Lang and Lehmann (2012) conjecture that search models with statistical dis-
crimination may better t the wage and employment data simultaneously.
The DMPmodel seeks to explain vacancy posting, unemployment, and wages
in terms of underlying economic incentives and a costly matching process. Em-
ployers put more resources and eort into hiring workers with higher expected
payos, higher chances of a successful search, and lower chances of a match
break. A role for discrimination can be present in at least two components of
the model. First, taste-based discrimination in hiring can take the form of
a wedge across groups in their matching productivity. Second, statistical dis-
crimination can also occur if rms utilize group-specic statistics to gauge the
long-term prospects of a potential hire. We introduce a parametric formulation
into the DMP model to control the degree to which statistical discrimination
can occur. A single parameter µ ∈ [0, 1] determines the degree to which individ-
2Although the DMP model has been questioned in its ability to account for unemployment
uctuations, for example by Shimer 2005, the model still remains the standard for studying
the natural rate of unemployment. Our analysis can be regarded as an exploration into the
determinants of unequal natural rates of unemployment among demographic groups.
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uals observe group-specic statistics (µ = 1) or just statistics common among
groups (µ = 0). The strategy to identify µ is a novel contribution of the paper.
We further extend the standard DMP framework along the following lines.
First, we allow workers to be nonparticipating in addition to being employed
or unemployed. This feature allows us to account for the signicant dierences
in participation rates between dierent genders and races. Nonparticipants
are allowed to search for jobs in the model to match the observed ows from
non-participation to employment, but unemployed and nonparticipating workers
dier in their search intensities. We also introduce life-cycle aspects to the model
by assuming that workers retire deterministically at age 65, which means that
the match between a retiring worker and a rm breaks in nite time. This
feature allows us to study the labor market outcomes over the life cycle, and
life-cycle patterns of potential discrimination.
We allow for human capital accumulation through learning-by-doing. Em-
ployed workers gain experience, which enhances their human capital. Being a
non-employed, either an unemployed or a non-participant, is costly since experi-
ence and human capital stay constant. This is an important channel to consider
because labor market attachment is very dierent for dierent groups. The
groups that are more likely to move out of the labor force are aected through
lost human capital causing stagnation in their wage growth. Firms also care
about the labor market attachment of their workers  as posting a vacancy is
costly for a rm, the higher likelihood of a match break has a negative eect on
the number of vacancies a rm is willing to open, and the wages the rm is will-
ing to pay. We allow labor markets to be segmented by demographic groups 
dened by gender and race/ethnicity but also by age, experience, and education
- in order to properly account for the observed degree of labor market dispar-
ities, particularly dierences in job-nding rates. Segmentation by itself does
not create discrimination but it makes it feasible. In particular, workers with
similar characteristics facing non-discriminatory employers should display sim-
ilar labor market outcomes, even if markets are segmented. In the same vein,
workers with intrinsically dierent fundamental characteristics should exhibit
dierent outcomes.
The main task of the paper is to disentangle the extent to which dierences
in human capital versus search frictions, which could include discrimination,
account for the observed dierences in labor market outcomes between dierent
demographic groups, through the lenses of the DMP model. We include all the
major demographic groups in the U.S. labor market in our analysis: females
and males (gender), Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites (race/ethnicity),
and college and non-college educated (education). The core of the paper is
the calibration of the fundamental parameters and the counterfactual exercises
assessing the role of dierent wedges in accounting for labor market disparities.
The spirit of the quantitative exercise is to let the data speak by itself through
the lenses of the DMP model. As in Chari et. al. (2007), we reverse engineer
the underlying parameters, and in particular implied parametric wedges among
demographic groups, needed to exactly match a number of targets for the various
groups during the 1998-2018 period. Specically, given estimated job separation
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rates, or hazard rates, and ows between unemployment and non-participation,
we use the model to calculate group-specic initial levels of human capital, age-
specic returns to experience, and matching productivities for the unemployed
and the nonparticipants required to exactly match stylized life-cycle patterns of
wages and job-nding rates for various demographic groups. The key parameter
µ is calibrated so that the white/black male ratio of vacancies per unemployed
worker, or tightness rate, is 1.5 consistent with the ndings of Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) regarding callback rates.
Parametric wedges, relative to a reference group, can then be calculated for
(i) initial human capitals; (ii) returns to experience; (iii) matching productiv-
ities for the unemployed and non-participants; and (iv) separation rates. The
extent to which each wedge accounts for observed disparities in wages, employ-
ment, earnings, nding rates, and other labor market outcomes, is then assessed
through counterfactual exercises of closing one wedge at a time. Wedges (i) and
(ii) refer explicitly to dierences in the human capital of the worker and can be
regarded as wedges in fundamentals. Wedges (iii) and (iv) are search frictions
wedges and may include elements of taste-based and statistical discrimina-
tion.
The following are the main results of the paper.
1. Our calibrated human capital series dier signicantly between demo-
graphic groups. Dierences start relatively small, at age 25, and widen over
the life cycle. Our estimates are roughly consistent with existing estimates in
the literature, particularly with Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (see Blau and
Kahn 2017 for a literature review for the case of gender gaps). Consistently
with this literature, we nd a potential role for discrimination embedded in
the dierent calibrated returns to education and returns to experience across
demographic groups. But we nd that human capital dierences alone cannot
explain dierences in key labor market outcomes. Additional wedges in search
frictions, specically in matching productivities and/or statistical discrimina-
tion, are required for the model to be able to match the dierential nding and
unemployment rates.
2. A version of the model without statistical discrimination can match the
wage and employment/unemployment data. Such a version would require sub-
stantial wedges in matching productivities and human capital. Those wedges
would be consistent with signicant taste-based discrimination in hiring and
promotions. However, the implied tightness rates would be relatively similar
across demographic groups.
3. Requiring the white/black male ratio of vacancies per unemployed worker
to be 1.5, consistent with the ndings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) re-
garding callbacks for interviews, implies that only the version with full statistical
discrimination can match this target. When rms can observe and use group-
specic statistics, particularly separation rates, then a worker belonging to a
group with less market attachment is less valuable to the rm. As a result,
rms post fewer vacancies for those type of workers. The model with statistical
discrimination naturally predicts a vacancy gap between Black and White work-
ers induced by the higher separation rates of the former. This gap narrows when
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statistical discrimination weakens. In this version of the model, our preferred
version, the need for wedges in matching productivities, and the potential role
for taste-based discrimination is signicantly downplayed, on average, although
it remains important for certain groups and certain outcomes, such as for the
nding rates of Black males and Asian females.
4. According to the calibrated model, human capital dierences account for
around 50% of the average gap in lifetime earnings, including all groups, search
frictions account for around 25%, and the remaining 25% is accounted for by
interactions between the two. These gures are consistent with other estimates
in the literature. Around 24% of the average gap is accounted for by statistical
discrimination.
5. We separately decompose skill gaps, or skill premiums, gender gaps, and
race/ethnic gaps. Regarding the average gaps in lifetime earnings, we nd that:
wedges in human capital variables account for 74% of the skill gap; 45% of the
gender gaps; and 47% of the average racial/ethnic gap. Statistical discrimi-
nation accounts for 15.2% of the skill gaps; 25% of the gender gap; and 31%
of the racial/ethnic gap in lifetime earnings. The majority of the wage gaps
can be explained by the dierences in human capital. However, the wedges in
human capital variables can explain only a fairly small part of the employment
gaps. Search frictions account for most of the gaps, in particular wedges in
separation rates. Statistical discrimination accounts for between 10 to 15% of
the employment gaps.
6. We nd that there are signicant dierences in matching productivities
between dierent demographic groups. However, as Hispanics have relatively
high matching productivities compared to Whites while the matching produc-
tivities of Asian and Black women are relatively low, those wedges largely cancel
out, and the matching eciencies cannot explain a large part of aggregate gaps
in labor market outcomes.
7. Wedges in job separation rates, particularly to non-participation, explain
a large fraction of the gaps in employment, wages, job-nding rates, life-cycle
welfare, and GDP. The role of match breaks into non-participation is larger for
gender gaps, but it is also quantitatively important for racial gaps in a variety
of labor outcomes.
8. Our model can explain Goldin (2014, pg 1097) puzzle regarding why
the gender gap in earnings increases over the life-cycle but closes after age 40.
A similar pattern is observed for race/ethnic gaps. According to our model,
this pattern is explained to a large extent by the pattern of separation rates,
which are higher for females in their 20's and 30's, but more similar to that of
males after age 40. In the presence of statistical discrimination, such a pattern
strongly inuences labor market outcomes such as earnings.
9. The matching eciency disproportionally falls at the end of the life cycle
for Hispanic and Asian males, and to some degree for Black males, suggesting
potential taste-based discrimination for older minority male groups.
There are two main theories of discrimination: taste-based discrimination,
pioneered by Becker (1957), and statistical discrimination, pioneered by Arrow
(1973) and Phelps (1972). Our ndings suggest that statistical discrimination
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is potentially a more important source of discrimination than prejudice. This
conclusion is consistent with a variety of micro evidence including List (2004),
Levit (2004), and Ewens et al. (2014). Lang and Lehmann (2002) reach a sim-
ilar conclusion in their review of the existing literature. Based on the survey
and micro-evidence, they argue that any theory of discrimination should rely on
either strong prejudice in only a small portion of the population or widespread
mild prejudice (pg 970). We nd a quantitatively small role for prejudice, and
a large potential role for statistical discrimination, based on the nding that
the pure taste-based discrimination model cannot generate sucient dierences
in Black-White tightness rates, as suggested by the callbacks evidence obtained
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), while the model with full statistical dis-
crimination can.
Separation rates are exogenous in our model, and dierences in separation
rates among demographic groups are the underlying source of statistical dis-
crimination. Our ndings suggest that models of statistical discrimination,
such as those Coate and Loury (1995), Rosen (1997), More and Norman (2004),
Gayle and Golan (2012), or Jarosch and Pilossoph (2019) among others, provide
promising lines of research for understanding labor market disparities. As this
literature makes clear, statistical discrimination may be individually rational
but not necessarily socially optimal. We discuss in more detail other related
literature in Section 6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, Section 3 explains the calibration strategy, Section 4 reports the calibra-
tion and decomposition results, Section 5 reports robustness checks, Section 6
provides a literature review, and Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
Consider a version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model ex-
tended to include heterogeneous workers and segmented labor markets. The
extended model also features a life-cycle with nite horizon, learning-by-doing,
and a non-participation state. Time is discrete and age is denoted by a where
a ∈ A ≡ [a, ā]. The focus of the model is on working years, after schooling and
education has been completed and before retirement.
1.1 Set Up
Workers. Individuals enter the labor market at age a, retire at age aR, and die
at age ā where ā > aR. We call non-retired individuals workers. At any point
in time worker are either employed, E, unemployed, U , or nonparticipants, N .
Let s ∈ S ≡
{
E,U,N
}
denote the employment status of a worker. Individuals
enter the labor market with no experience and gain experience through employ-
ment. Let e ∈ [0, ā− a] denote years of experience. Each period of employ-
ment increases experience by one, ea+1 = ea + 1, and each non-working period
keeps experience constant, ea+1 = ea. Individuals also belong to a demographic
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group i dened by gender (female, male), race and/or ethnicity (Asian, Black,
Hispanic, or non-Hispanic White), and education level (skilled, unskilled). For
example, i could refer to an skilled Black female. Let I denote the set of demo-
graphic groups. A worker is fully identied by her/his years of experience (e),
age (a), labor status (s), and demographic group (i). Denote by x = (e, a, s, i)
the state, or type, of a worker where x∈ [0, ā− a] × [a, aR] × S × I and let
x′ = (e+1, a+1, s, i). The state of a retiree is dened as xR =
(
e, aR, N, i
)
. It is
useful to dene gsi (e, a) ≡ gi (e, a, s) ≡ g(x) which provides three ways to write
the same expression. Furthermore, whenever employment status is obvious, we
just write gi (e, a) .
Let m (x) the mass of workers of type x. The initial mass distribution,
msi (0, a) is given for all s and i. Workers transition into unemployment and
non-participation at exogenous rates π̄EU (x), π̄EN (x), π̄UN (x), and π̄NU (x) ,
and into employment at endogenous rates π̄NE (x) and π̄UE (x) . Let c (x) and
w (x) denote consumption and wage of type x. Workers seek to maximize their
expected present value of consumption. They are risk neutral and discount
the future according to the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). There are no savings
so that c (x)=w (x) for employed workers. Wages of employed workers are de-
termined by Nash-bargaining with employers while wages, or consumption, of
non-employed workers and retirees are given by c(x), an exogenous parametric
form. For completeness, it is convenient to dene cEi (e, a) = c
U
i (e, a) which
would allow for a concise notation when describing the solution for wages. For
simplicity, we do not explicitly describe the domain of each function whenever
is clear. For example, w(x) refers to employed workers only, x =
(
e, a, Ē, i
)
. 3
Human capital : Human capital of a worker, h(x), is of the general type.
There is no rm-specic human capital. We assume the following functional
form:
h (x) = yi exp (r (x) e) , (1)
where yi is a baseline, or entering, level of human capital associated to group
i while r(x) is a type-specic returns to experience. Both yi and r (x) are
exogenous. We also refer to yi as educational human capital, the human capital
of a new worker for whom e = 0. Dierences in baseline productivity, yi,
and returns to experience, r(x), across types could capture dierences in the
quality and quantity of education among demographic groups, dierences in
occupations and industries in which a representative worker of each type works,
and discrimination. Central to our accounting exercise is to calibrate parameters
yi and r(x) for all x.
Our formulation assumes that post-schooling human capital formation is of
the learning-by-doing type as in Barlevy (2008), Yamaguchi (2010) and Bagger
et. al. (2014). An alternative formulation, for example of the Ben-Porath
form, is possible. However, Heckman et. al. (2002) argue that it is dicult
3We maintain various convenient assumptions of the canonical DMP model such as zero
savings, exogenous job-separation rates and exogenous consumption of the non-employed. The
focus of the model is thus on determining employment/unemployment rates, wages, nding-
and tightness- rates for all type of workers, as dened by x. For example, the job nding rate
of a 45 year-old non-participant skilled Black female with 10 years of experience.
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to distinguish between learning-by-doing and on-the-job training based on the
empirical evidence.
Firms and labor markets: There is a continuum of innitely-lived rms
who seek to maximize their expected present value of prots net of hiring costs.
Firms are risk neutral and discount the future at the same rate as workers do.
Labor markets are assumed to be perfectly segmented across worker's types.
Firms can freely enter in any of the segmented markets. Firms post vacancies
for long-term positions at a cost of κ (x) per vacancy, a cost that may depend
on worker's type. A successful match produces h (x) units of output per-period
while gross per-period prots are h (x)−w (x). A match is destroyed exogenously
at the rate d (x).
The assumption of segmented market requires some discussion. First, seg-
mentation is needed in order for the model to match key features of the data
such as dierential job-nding rates among demographic groups, as we will
show. Second, segmentation across race, gender, ethnicity and age may be un-
lawful, as it may violate the Civil Rights Act and/or the Employment Act for
example. However, discriminatory behavior is hard to prove in practice. The ev-
idence suggests that anti-discriminatory laws have had limited success (Valfort
2018).4 Third, segmentation by itself does not create discrimination although it
makes it feasible. In particular, workers with similar characteristics facing non-
discriminatory employers should display similar labor market outcomes even if
markets are segmented. Fourth, in the absence of discrimination, segmentation
would be required for allocations to be ecient. On that regard, we would need
even more segmentation than what we are allowing.
Matching technology: A worker and a rm with a vacant position are ran-
domly matched in each of the sub-market according to the matching technology
M (u(x), v(x);x) , where u(x) and v(x) are the masses of workers and rms
searching in a particular labor market. We assume that all unemployed workers
search for a job, employed workers do not search, and a fraction ψ (x) < 1 of
nonparticipants search for a job.5 Thus,
u(x) =
 m(x), if s = U ,ψ (x)m(x), if s = N ,
0 otherwise.
 (2)
We assume that the matching technology adopts a standard Cobb-Douglas form
M(u, v;x) = A (x)uαv(1−α) where A(x) represents the eciency of the match-
ing technology and it is allowed to depend on workers' type. Dierences in
matching eciency across types reect search frictions associated to particular
labor markets. Once a match is formed, the output of the match is distributed
according to a Nash bargaining solution in which a worker's bargaining power
is φ (x).
4As noted by Lang and Lehmann (2012, pg 970), almost all models they review implicitly
assume such illegal practices.
5Job to job search are suboptimal in the model given that there is no expected gain from
a match break.
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Let θ (x) ≡ v(x)u(x) denote the tightness of a particular labor market, the
number of vacancies per job seeker. A rm's probability of lling a vacancy
is given by q(x) = M (u(x), v(x);x) /v (x) = A (x) (θ (x))−α, and a non em-
ployed worker's probability of nding a job is f (x) = M (u(x), v(x);x) /u (x) =
A (x) (θ (x))
1−α. These expressions make clear that nding rates are sole func-
tions of job tightness rates and the eciencies of the matching function.
The following assumption will guarantee that matches generate a strictly
positive surplus.
Assumption 1 h(x) > c̄(x) and c(xR)increases (weakly) with experience.
This rst part of the assumption is standard. The second part reinforces the
benet of remaining in a match as it (weakly) increases pensions. Otherwise,
h(x) > c̄(x) may not be sucient to guarantee that a match generates a positive
surplus.
Statistical discrimination: The notion that employers use statistics spe-
cic to a demographic group when assessing individual's prospects is present
in the model through the destruction rates d(x). Specically, rms in a given
market x can perfectly forecast the human capital of the worker the are looking
to hire, but the expected duration of the match depends on job separation rates,
d(x), specic to that market. Statistical discrimination arises if d(x) is a func-
tion of i, the demographic identier. To assess the extent to which statistical
discrimination is prevalent in labor markets, at the light of the model, we assume
that rms and workers only observe a noisy signal of the true job destruction
rate of group x. While the true job destruction rate is d̄ (x) ≡ π̄EU (x)+π̄EN (x),
rms and workers observe d (x)=µd̄ (x) + (1− µ) d̂ (x) where µ ∈ [0, 1] is a pa-
rameter and d̂ (x) is a reference, or baseline, destruction rate common among
all groups. For example, d̂ (x) could be the average destruction rate across de-
mographic groups or it could be the job destruction rate of a reference group
such as White males. On the one extreme, if µ = 1 then rms are able to
perfectly (statistically) discriminate when posting vacancies and negotiating
wages by using group-specic average separation rates. On the other extreme, if
µ = 0 rms can only use destruction rates common for all demographic groups.
Similarly for workers. They observe πEU (x)=µπ̄EU (x) + (1− µ) π̂EU (x) and
πEN (x)=µπ̄EN (x) + (1− µ) π̂EN (x) where π̂EU (x) and π̂EU (x) are dened
analogously to d̂ (x). Parameter µ will be calibrated.6
Gaps and taste-based discrimination: Before moving into the details
of the model, it is convenient to briey explain the main goal of the paper at
the light of the set up just described. We use the model's solution to calibrate
and/or reverse engineering some of the parameters of the model such as µ, yi,
r(x), κ (x), A(x), φ (x), and/or ψ (x). Reverse engineering is a step further
61− µ could be interpreted as the degree of compliance with anti-discrimination laws. For
example, when µ = 0 rms are still able to post vacancies and negotiate wages contingent on
workers' human capital but unable to dierentiate workers in terms of their expected match
length. This would eliminate statistical discrimination based on, for example, women's higher
likelihood of exiting the labor force because of family reasons.
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from calibration in the sense that it seeks to match complete sequences of wages
and nding rates of dierent groups over the entire life-cycle, not only some
selected moments or stylized facts. The result are then used to calculate and
interpret gaps in parameters across gender, race/ethnicity, age and education.
Finally, counterfactual exercises are performed. The calibrated gaps represent
the underlying fundamental sources of unequal labor market outcomes among
demographic groups, according to the model. By separating human capital from
other forces, the model suggests potential discriminatory behavior underlying
a number of these parametric gaps. Taste-based discrimination during the hir-
ing process could be linked to gaps in parameters κ (x), A(x) and/or ψ (x),
while taste-based discrimination during employment could be linked to gaps in
parameters r(x) and/or φ (x).
1.2 Recursive formulation
1.2.1 A rm's problem
Let V̄ be the value of a rm without a worker and J(x) be the value of a rm
with an employed worker of type x =
[
e, a, E, i
]
. Then
J(x) =
 h (x)− w (x) + β
[
d (x) V̄ + (1− d (x)) J (x′)
]
if a ≤ a < aR − 1,
h (x)− w (x) + βV̄ if a = aR − 1
 .
The rst part of the expression states that the value of a rm with a worker is the
ow of gross prots plus the discounted continuation value of the match. The
continuation value consists the value of posting a new vacancy, V̄ , if the match
is destroyed, which occurs with a probability d (x), and the value of remaining
in the match, Ji(e + 1, a + 1), which occurs with a probability 1 − d (x). The
second part of the expression states that a rm with a worker who is about to
retire will become a rm with no workers in the following period.
The value of a rm posting a vacancy in market x is:
V (x) = max
{
−κ (x) + β
[
q (x) Ji (e, a+ 1) + (1− q (x)) V̄
]
, 0
}
.
The maximum value of posting a vacancy in any labor market is then given by:
V̄ = max
x
{V (x) , 0} .
Free entry of rms into any labor market guarantees that the values of unlled
vacancies must all be equal to zero: V (x) = 0 for all feasible x. As a result
V̄ = 0 as well. Active rms are thus indierent in which type of a worker to hire
and in which segmented market to operate as long as the free entry condition
holds.7
7Prejudicial employers may still operate in markets they despise if, for example, negotiated
wages in that market are suciently low as to break even.
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The problem of rm with a worker then simplies to
J(x) =
 h (x)− w (x) + β (1− d (x)) J (x
′)
if a ≤ a < aR − 1,
h (x)− w (x) if a = aR − 1
 , (3)
while for rms posting vacancies
κ (x) = βq (x) Ji (e, a+ 1) = βf (x) θ (x)
−1
Ji (e, a+ 1) for a ≤ a < aR−1. (4)
The last equation states that the expected present value of lling a vacancy
must be just enough to recover the costs of posting the vacancy.
1.2.2 An individual's problem
Consider now the (maximum) expected present value of earnings of an employed
worker, E, an unemployed worker, U, a nonparticipant worker, N , and a retired
worker, R. The expected utility of a newly retiree satises:
R (xR) =
a∑
i=aR
βi−aRc(xR) =
1− βa−aR−1
1− β
c(xR). (5)
Like rms, workers do not necessarily know their true match break probabilities
and use the weighted average match break probabilities πEU (x) and πEN (x) in
their value functions. The corresponding value functions E, U , and N can then
be written recursively as:
E(x) =

w(x) + β
[
πEU (x)U(x
′) + πEN (x)N(x
′)
+(1− πEU (x)− πEN (x))E(x′)
]
if a ≤ a < aR − 1
w(x) + βRi
(
e+ 1, aR, N
)
if a = aR − 1
 , (6)
U(x) =

c(x) + β
[
f(x)Ei(e, a+ 1) + π̄UN (x)Ni(e, a+ 1)
+(1− f(x)− π̄UN (x)Ui(e, a+ 1)
]
if a ≤ a < aR − 1
c(x) + βRi
(
e, aR, N
)
if a = aR − 1
 , (7)
N(x) =

c(x) + β
[
f(x)Ei(e, a+ 1) + π̄NU (x)Ui(e, a+ 1)
+(1− f(x)− π̄NU (x))Ni(e, a+ 1)
]
if a ≤ a < aR − 1
c(x) + βRi
(
e, aR, N
)
if a = aR − 1
 , (8)
The interpretation of these functionals is intuitive. An employed worker con-
sumes his/her wage w(x) each period. A match between a worker and a rm
can be destroyed in two ways: with (perceived) probability πEU (x), a worker
becomes unemployed, and with probability πEN (x) the worker become non-
participant. The worker continues producing with probability 1 − πEU (x) −
πEN (x) and stays in the employment state. At the beginning of each period,
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an unemployed worker consumes c(x)=ci(e, a, Ū) during unemployment. Next
period, he may nd a job with probability f(x) = fi(e, a, Ū) in which case he
moves to the employment state. He may also move to non-participation with
probability π̄UN (x), and otherwise he will stay unemployed. Similarly for a
nonparticipating worker.
It is convenient to dene the average utility of individual x as:
W (x) = mEi (e, a)E(x) +m
U
i (e, a)U(x) +m
N
i (e, a)N(x). (9)
1.2.3 Nash bargaining
Wages in the model are negotiated through Nash bargaining. Firms and workers
share the match surplus S(x) = E(x)−U(x)+J(x), given the bargaining weights
φ (x) for the worker and 1− φ (x) for the rm, in the following way:8
max
E−U,J
(E − U)φ(x)J1−φ(x) subject to S(x) = E − U + J.
The solution for each labor market satises:
J(x) = Θ (x)× (E(x)− U(x)) where Θ (x) = 1− φ (x)
φ (x)
. (10)
1.3 Aggregate labor ows
Given the initial distribution of workers, msi (0, a), and job-nding rates f(x)
for all x, subsequent distribution of workers m(x) can be calculated assuming
a law of large numbers. The mass of individuals with no experience at age
a ∈ [a, aR − 2] satises:
mEi (0, a+ 1) = f
U
i (0, a)×mUi (0, a) + fNi (0, a)×mNi (0, a);
mUi (0, a+ 1) = (1− π̄UN (x)− fUi (0, a))×mUi (0, a) + π̄NU (x)×mNi (0, a);
mNi (0, a+ 1) = (1− π̄NU (x)− fNi (0, a))×mNi (0, a) + π̄UN (x)×mUi (0, a).
(11)
8We assume that the outside option for a worker during bargaining is always unemploy-
ment, U . An alternative specication is to allow the outside option of the worker to be
non-participation, or a mix between both. As discussed in Cordoba et. al. (2020), eciency
requires the surplus of a new worker to be dened relative to the worker's previous state,
before becoming employed, either unemployed or non-participation. But eciency does not
restrict how the surplus is divided for workers with tenure in the job. For tractability, we as-
sume a simple outside option, unemployment. This reduces the vector x but also implies that
allocations are not fully ecient. We provide a robustness check of using non-participation as
the outside option.
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Moreover, the mass of individuals with experience e ∈ [1, a] at age a ∈ [a, aR − 2]
satises:
mEi (e, a+ 1) = (1− π̄EU (x)− π̄EN (x))×mEi (e− 1, a) + fUi (e, a)×mUi (e, a)
+ fNi (e, a)×mNi (e, a);
mUi (e, a+ 1) = (1− π̄UN (x)− fUi (e, a))×mUi (e, a) + π̄NU (x)×mNi (e, a)
+ π̄EU (x)×mEi (e− 1, a);
mNi (e, a+ 1) = (1− π̄NU (x)− fNi (e, a))×mNi (e, a) + π̄UN (x)×mUi (e, a)
+ π̄iEN (x)×mEi (e− 1, a).
(12)
Notice that while the rms and the workers may not be sure about the accurate
match break probabilities, π̄EU and π̄EN , the actual ows into employment, un-
employment, and non-participation evolve according to the actual probabilities.
1.4 Characterization of the solution
We now provide some characterization of the solution for wages, tightness rates
and job-nding rates using backward induction. In particular, closed-form so-
lutions for the last period of working life are obtained and then used to nd
solutions for the previous periods.
1.4.1 Solution for a = aR − 1
Workers work until age aR − 1. Denote by xR−1 ≡ x
(
e, aR − 1, Ē, i
)
the nal
state of a worker, just before retirement. Using (3), (6) and (7), the Nash
Bargaining solution (10) for a terminal state simplies to:
h (xR−1)−w(xR−1) = Θ (xR−1)
[
w(xR−1)− c̄Ui (e, aR − 1) + β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR)
]
,
where ∆Ri (e+ 1, aR) = Ri (e+ 1, aR) − Ri (e, aR) is the increase in the value
of retirement due to an extra year of experience at the moment of retirement.
This equation provides a solution for the last period wages as:
w(xR−1) =
h (xR−1) + Θ (xR−1)
[
c̄Ui (e, aR − 1)− β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR)
]
1 + Θ (xR−1)
. (13)
According to this expression, wages are a weighted average between the worker's
human capital and the level of consumption of the unemployed net of gains in
retirement funds. If the worker has all the bargaining power (Θ (xR−1) = 0),
wage equals human capital. On the other extreme, if the rm holds all the
power (Θ (xR−1) =∞), wages equal consumption of the unemployed minus any
gains in retirement funds from the added experience of being employed.
The solution for the terminal value of the rm is then given by
J(xR−1) = (1− φ (xR−1))
[
h (xR−1)− c̄Ui (e, aR − 1) + β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR)
]
.
(14)
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The terminal value of the rm is a fraction of the surplus of the match which
includes production plus added retirement funds minus unemployed consump-
tion. Assumption 1 guarantees that J(xR−1) is positive. The terminal value of
the rm can be used to determine the terminal job tightness ratio which occurs
at age aR − 2 . According to (4) and the denition of q(x) :
θsi (e, aR − 2) =
vsi (e, aR − 2)
usi (e, aR − 2)
=
[
βAi (e, aR − 2, s)
κi (e, aR − 2, s)
J(xR−1)
]1/α
. (15)
This expression, together with (14), shows that vacancies are more abundant
for workers with higher human capital, lower outside consumption and/or in
more ecient labor markets characterized by a higher A and/or a lower κ. The
model predicts, for example, more open vacancies for experienced workers and
immigrants with lower outside options, all else equal. The terminal job nding
rate can be solved as
fsi (e, aR − 2)α =
Ai(e, aR − 2, s)
κi (e, aR − 2, s)1−α
(J(xR−1))
1−α
. (16)
job-nding rates are higher in markets with more ecient matching, lower costs
of posting vacancies, and/or higher value for active rms.
1.4.2 Solution for a < aR − 1
The solutions for other periods can be expressed in terms of workers' surpluses
and/or value changes dened as:
SEU (x) ≡ E(x)− U(xUi (e, a)); SEN (x) ≡ E(x)−N(xNi (e, a)); (17)
SNU (x) ≡ N(x)− U(xUi (e, a)); SUN (x) ≡ U(x)−N(xNi (e, a));
∆U(x) ≡ U(x)− Ui(e− 1, a); ∆N(x) = N(e, a)−Ni(e− 1, a).
The following proposition provides a partial characterization of the solution for
wages, tightness rates and job-nding rates.
Proposition 1 The solutions for w(x), θ (x) and f (x), for 0 ≤ a < aR − 1,
satisfy:
w(x) =
h (x) + Θ (x) [c̄ (x) + βΩ (x)]
1 + Θ (x)
, (18)
θ (x) =
[
βA (x) Ji(e, a+ 1)
κ (x)
] 1
α
, and (19)
f(x)α =
A(x)
κ (x)
1−α (βJi(e, a+ 1))
1−α , where (20)
Ω (x) = fUi (e, a)S
i
EU (e, a+ 1) + π̄UN (x)S
i
NU (e, a+ 1) (21)
+πEN (x) [SEN (x
′)− SEU (x′)]−∆U i (e+ 1, a+ 1) ,
Ji (e, a+ 1) = Θ (x)S
i
EU (e, a+ 1), and
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SEU (x) = w(x)− c̄Ui (e, a) + β
 (1− πEU (x))SEU (x′)− πEN (x)SEN (x′)−π̄UN (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
−fUi (e, a)SiEU (e, a+ 1) + ∆U (x′)
 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The expression for wages, equation (18), generalizes (13). The term βΩ(x)
collects all "net" losses of remaining employed. Wages increase with Ω (x) to
compensate worker for those losses to an extent determined by the bargaining
power. In particular, a higher job nding probability, fUi , increases wages since
SiEU (e, a+ 1) > 0. Intuitively, the higher the chances of nding a new job
the higher the losses associated to remaining in the current job. Furthermore,
wage equal human capital if Θ (x) = 0 while in the other extreme wage equal
c̄Ui (e, a) + βΩ (x) when Θ (x) = ∞. According to these expressions, unequal
wages among workers with identical human capital only arise if rms have some
bargaining power, Θ (x) > 0, and workers have dierent outside options or
prospects. Workers with better outside options, as reected by c̄Ui (e, a)+βΩ (x),
are paid more. Unequal pay for equal job, the idea that w(xA) 6= w(xB) even
when h(xA) = h(xB), arises naturally into the model due to search frictions.
Equation (20) shows that nding rates are a direct function of the economic
value of the worker to the rm, Ji(e, a+ 1). Discrimination in hiring could arise
through the term A(x)
κ(x)1−α
: a particularly low matching eciency for type−x
workers or an unusually high cost of hiring type−x workers would lead to nding
rates lower than what is justied by the economic value of the worker to the
rm.
The key role of job separation rates and of statistical discrimination can also
be gauged from these expressions. Consider the eect of πEU (x) on wages and
nding rates. For a given sequence of wages, inspection of the formulas reveal
that a higher πEU (x) reduces workers surplus SEU (x) at state x but also at all
states leading to state x. This reduces incentives to post vacancies for those
type of workers. Lower surpluses also lower the sequence of wages, according to
(18), but only of wages in previous periods leading up to state x. Current and
future wages are not aected by a higher destruction rate at state x.
To gain some further intuition about the determination of wages, consider
the determination of wages two periods before retirement. Denote by xR−2 =
x(e, aR−2, Ē, i). First, using the solutions already obtained for a = aR−1, the
following results can be found:
SEU (xR−1) = w(xR−1)− c̄Ui (e, aR − 1) + β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR) ,
SEN (xR−1) = w(xR−1)− c̄Ni (e, aR − 1) + β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR) ,
SNU (xR−1) = c̄
N
i (e, aR − 1)− cUi (e, aR − 1) ,
∆U i (e+ 1, aR − 1) = c̄Ui (e+ 1, aR − 1)− c̄Ui (e, aR − 1) + β∆Ri (e+ 1, aR) .
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Furthermore, suppose just for illustration that c̄ (x) = c̄ for all x. In that case
SEU (xR−1) = w(xR−1)− c̄, SEN (xR−1) = w(xR−1)− c̄,
SNU (xR−1) = 0, ∆U
i (e+ 1, aR − 1) = 0, and
W (xR−2) = f
U
i (e, aR − 2)SiEU (e, aR − 1) .
Plugging these results into (18), it follows that:
w(xR−2) =
h (xR−2) + Θ (xR−2)
[
c̄+ βfUi (e, aR − 2) (w(xR−1)− c̄)
]
1 + Θ (xR−2)
.
This expression illustrates the determination of wages, and in particular the
role of the job nding rate. A higher current job nding rate tend to increase
current wages unless Θ (xR−2) = 0. If Θ (xR−2) = 0 then w(aR−2) = h (aR−2).
On the other extreme, if Θ (xR−2) =∞ then
w(xR−2) = c̄+ βf
U
i (e, aR − 2) (w(xR−1)− c̄) ,
a minimum wage that reects the value of the outside option. In conclusion,
in the presence of search frictions, wages do not reect only the underlying
true productivitiy of the worker. As a result, simple Mincer regressions on
wages in the presence of search frictions and unemployment will not provide a
correct estimate of the underlying human capital of the worker over the life-
cycle. In the next section, we reverse engineer human capitals of workers in
dierent markets over the life-cycle using the search model. As expected from
the previous discussion, our estimated human capitals dier signicantly from
wages for certain groups.
We next calibrate the model and use it to perform a levels accounting type
exercise.
2 Data
2.1 CPS Data 1998-2018
We use the basic monthly data between years 1998 and 2018 from the CPS
(Current Population Survey) for both full- and part-time U.S. workers (CEPR
2019; Flood et. al. 2018). We disaggregate the data based on an individual's
race or ethnicity (Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites), gender (male, female),
and education level (college, non-college, and average). In total, we investigate
4 x 2 x 3 = 24 dierent race/ethnicity-gender-education groups. To ensure that
the demographic groups are mutually exclusive, we group all individuals, whose
ethnicity is Hispanic, under Hispanic group, despite of their race, while we
group all non-Hispanic Asians, Blacks, and Whites under corresponding racial
groups.9 We divide individuals into two education groups: college, or skilled,
9The data consist more than 5 million observations for both White males and females. The
total numbers of observations for Hispanics and Blacks, males and females vary from about
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and non-college, or unskilled. An individual is assigned to the college group,
if she/he has completed at least some college, and to the non-college group, if
an individual's highest level of completed education is high-school or less. By
including the named demographic and socio-economic groups, our data consists
of a representative sample of around 96 percent of the U.S. population (Census
2020).
We then calculate life-cycle patterns of average wages, employment, unem-
ployment, and non-participation for the described demographic groups to com-
pare various labor market outcomes between the groups. We rely on the hourly
wage rates obtained from the CEPR (2019) while the other data are obtained
from the raw CPS data les from IPUMS (Flood et. al. 2018). The advantage
of using the CEPR wage data instead of the raw CPS data is that the CEPR
adjusts the raw CPS wage data such that the constructed wage data series are
consistent and comparable over time and especially suitable for research uses.10
We also estimate age-specic, monthly transition probabilities between employ-
ment (E), unemployment (U), and non-participation (N) separately for each
group, following the method in Choi et. al. (2014). In practice, the transition
probability estimates are weighted average ows between labor market statuses
for every age, when controlling for birth cohorts. For a given cohort and survey
year, we observe the fraction of individuals for a given age that transfers from
one labor market status to another. Denote this variable as πss′(a, c, i), where
ss′ denotes the transition from a status s ∈ [E,U,N ] to a status s′ ∈ [E′, U ′, N ′]
, a denotes an individual's age, c denotes the cohort (the birth year) an individ-
ual belongs to, and i denotes the year of the survey. We obtain the estimated
transition probabilities by running seemingly unrelated regressions of πss′(a, c, i)
against age dummies. The coecient for each age dummy is the probability that
a transition happens at age a. A limitation of the CPS data is that it does not
contain a variable capturing the work experience of individuals. As a result,
only average (over experience) transition probabilities can be estimated. We
denote these estimated transition probabilities, π̄ss′ (e, a, s, i), as π̄ss′ (a, s, i) .
To remove high-frequency reversals of transitions between unemployment
and non-participation, we follow the method suggested by Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2015) called "deNUNication". The key idea is to correct for a possible
classication error of an individual's labor market status: an individual who
move from non-participation to unemployment and back to non-participation
within a short period of time is likely a nonparticipant, and including this high-
frequency transitions back and forth may lead to spurious transition estimates.
The correction method thus recodes the high-frequency transitions, NUN, as
NNN. Same method is applied to high-frequency transition from unemployment
to non-participation and back.
ve hundred thousands to seven hundred thousands. The numbers of observations for Asian
males and females are much smaller, about three hundred thousands for each group. We
exclude American Indian and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians and Other Pacic Islanders,
and Multiracial groups from our analysis due to their small sample sizes.
10For detailed description, please refer to the CEPR-CPS documentation found in
https://ceprdata.org/cps-uniform-data-extracts/cps-basic-programs/.
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The estimated ows between dierent labor market states are ow probabil-
ities from employment to unemployment or non-participation, π̄EU (a, s, i) and
π̄EN (a, s, i), unemployment to non-participation, π̄UN (a, s, i), non-participation
to unemployment, π̄NU (a, s, i), and unemployment and non-participation to em-
ployment, π̄UE(a, s, i), and π̄NE(a, s, i). As the time period in our model cal-
ibration will be set to a quarter instead of a month, we calculate quarterly
transition probability matrices, ΛQ(a, s, i), as ΛQ(a, s, i) = (ΛM (a, s, i))3 where
ΛM (a, s, i) equals 1 − π̄EU (a, s, i) − π̄EN (a, s, i) π̄EU (a, s, i) π̄EN (a, s, i)π̄UE(a, s, i) 1 − π̄UE(a, s, i) − π̄UN (a, s, i) π̄UN (a, s, i)
π̄NE(a, s, i) π̄NU (a, s, i) 1 − π̄NE(a, s, i) − π̄NU (a, s, i)
 .
2.2 Stylized facts
We now highlight stylized features of the data regarding dierent demographic
groups. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the life-cycle averages of various
labor market outcomes. Figure 2, presented in the Introduction, and Figure 3
portrays corresponding average life-cycle proles.
Table 1 documents some well-known facts. Whites, males, and the skilled
groups tend to exhibit better labor market outcomes than minority groups, fe-
males, and the unskilled, in terms of, for example, higher wages, higher employ-
ment rates, lower unemployment rates, higher job-nding rates, lower separation
rates and, overall, higher average earnings. There are, however, some important
exceptions to this characterization. Skilled Asian males outperform other groups
in wages and earnings, while Hispanic males, skilled and unskilled, outperform
other groups in terms of employment rates and job-nding rates. Labor market
outcomes of Black males are particularly problematic: they have the highest
rate of unemployment, both among the skilled and the unskilled, highest sep-
aration rate to unemployment, unusually high non-participation rates among
males, and the second lowest nding rate of the unskilled, and second lowest
wage rate of the skilled.
Consider next the full life-cycle proles. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show persis-
tent gaps over the entire life-cycle with few but important exceptions. Consider
rst the wage gaps in Figure 2. For each gender-race pair, life-cycle wage growth
shows the well-known pattern: wages grow rapidly for young workers, the wage
growth then attens, and starts to decrease later in the career. Wages for both
Asian males and females have slightly dierent patterns in the CPS data com-
pared to other groups: their wages peak earlier, around age 40, and start to
decrease after that. The within-group wage gaps are fairly small for young
workers, but as the wage growth rates dier between groups, the wage gaps
increase over the life cycle. Within race, males have higher wage growth rates
compared to females, and Asians have the highest wage growth rate among each
gender, followed by Whites and Blacks. An average White female has a very
similar wage growth pattern as average Hispanic and Black males. Interestingly,
Asian males and females have the highest wage growth rates early in life, along
with White males, which partly arises because of the higher schooling level of
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Groups Pop Wage Employ. Unemp. Non‐Part UE NE EU EN Earnings
Share rate rate rate
White male 31.3% 30.2 79.8% 3.5% 16.7% 48.3% 20.4% 2.1% 4.1% 9,604         
White female 31.5% 23.3 67.1% 2.6% 30.3% 43.6% 14.8% 1.6% 6.6% 6,254         
Black male 6.2% 21.5 66.3% 6.9% 26.8% 38.1% 19.9% 4.0% 7.1% 5,679         
Black female 6.8% 19.4 63.4% 5.4% 31.2% 34.5% 17.8% 3.0% 8.1% 4,915         
Asian male 3.1% 32.3 82.6% 3.6% 13.9% 43.6% 30.7% 1.8% 4.6% 10,744      
Asian female 3.4% 25.4 64.9% 2.7% 32.3% 36.1% 16.5% 1.5% 8.4% 6,621         
Hispanic male 9.1% 20.4 81.4% 5.1% 13.5% 57.5% 34.6% 3.7% 5.2% 6,621         
Hispanic female 8.7% 17.6 57.7% 4.2% 38.1% 38.7% 17.1% 2.7% 11.3% 4,066         
White male 19.3% 34.7 84.4% 2.9% 12.7% 48.6% 24.4% 1.7% 3.0% 11,645      
White female 20.5% 26.4 71.9% 2.4% 25.6% 46.3% 17.1% 1.5% 6.0% 7,596         
Black male 2.9% 25.3 74.8% 5.9% 19.3% 41.3% 25.4% 3.3% 5.5% 7,523         
Black female 3.6% 22.7 71.3% 4.7% 24.0% 38.2% 22.2% 2.5% 6.8% 6,436         
Asian male 1.9% 36.8 84.0% 3.4% 12.6% 42.2% 29.7% 1.6% 4.1% 12,471      
Asian female 2.2% 29.3 68.1% 2.7% 29.1% 36.1% 17.0% 1.3% 7.5% 8,022         
Hispanic male 3.0% 27.5 83.9% 4.3% 11.8% 50.3% 32.9% 2.6% 4.3% 9,207         
Hispanic female 3.3% 22.7 69.6% 3.8% 26.5% 40.4% 19.9% 2.0% 7.8% 6,309         
White male 12.0% 21.9 72.4% 4.5% 23.2% 48.1% 17.2% 2.9% 4.7% 6,327         
White female 11.0% 16.4 57.9% 3.2% 39.0% 39.4% 12.1% 2.1% 8.1% 3,807         
Black male 3.2% 17.1 58.1% 8.1% 33.8% 35.8% 16.9% 5.1% 8.9% 3,964         
Black female 3.2% 14.4 53.5% 6.5% 40.0% 31.0% 14.5% 3.8% 10.1% 3,082         
Asian male 1.2% 18.3 78.4% 4.7% 16.9% 42.8% 30.6% 2.7% 5.8% 5,753         
Asian female 1.2% 14.6 59.7% 2.8% 37.6% 36.6% 16.7% 1.7% 10.5% 3,488         
Hispanic male 6.1% 16.7 79.8% 5.6% 14.6% 59.5% 35.0% 4.2% 5.7% 5,332         
Hispanic female 5.4% 13.5 50.5% 4.6% 44.9% 37.6% 16.0% 3.4% 14.1% 2,731         
Race Ratio 0.59 0.78 0.93 1.63 1.13 0.92 1.26 1.65 1.53 0.73
Gender Ratio 1.02 0.80 0.83 0.78 1.85 0.85 0.67 0.77 1.77 0.67
Skill Ratio 0.76 0.60 0.84 1.50 1.56 0.95 0.85 1.76 1.56 0.50
Race gap 9.0% 2.6% ‐18.9% ‐4.5% 3.2% ‐8.9% ‐19.5% ‐16.5% 11.2%
Gender gap 11.5% 9.7% 12.3% ‐29.9% 7.9% 20.2% 13.2% ‐28.1% 20.3%
Skill gap 20.9% 7.7% ‐17.7% ‐19.5% 2.0% 7.1% ‐24.8% ‐19.4% 27.2%
All gaps 43.4% 17.9% ‐24.1% ‐48.3% 8.7% 20.2% ‐30.0% ‐51.5% 63.1%
Total
Skilled
Unskilled
Ratio
Average gains of eliminating demographic gaps (% increase)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Basic Counterfactuals (CPS 2018).
an average Asian but also from higher initial returns to school particular for
Asian males.11 Overall, wage gaps start small, increase over the life cycle, but
compress at the end of the working life.
Figure 2 also shows the average unemployment, and non-participation rates,
as well as job-nding rates for the unemployed for each gender-race pair, and
the following patterns are observed. Unemployment rates are higher for younger
workers, but decrease up to age 35, and stay fairly constant after that. White
and Asian males and females have the lowest unemployment rates, while Black
males and females have signicantly higher unemployment rates over the whole
life cycle, and especially when they are young. Hispanics do better in terms
of unemployment rates compared to Blacks, but their rates are still higher
compared to Whites and Asians. Within race/ethnicity, Hispanic females have
higher unemployment rates and Black females lower unemployment rates com-
pared to males, while the unemployment rates are fairly similar for White and
Asian males and females.
Figure 2 reveals variation in life-cycle non-participation rates between groups.
11We were able to conrm these stylized facts for Asian groups using Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) data although, due to the small sample size, the results are noisy.
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In general, non-participation rates are lower for younger workers, but start to
increase rapidly after age 55 for all groups. Females are more likely to be non-
participating over the whole life cycle and especially before age 45. Within
male groups, the non-participation rates are quite similar over the whole life
cycle, only exception being Black males: they are more likely to be nonpar-
ticipating over the whole life cycle compared to other male groups, and their
non-participation rate starts to increase earlier, around age 45. In fact, the
non-participation rate of Black males is closer to the non-participation rates of
female groups than other male groups after age 45. It is not clear why the non-
participation rate for black males diers from the rate of other male groups. An
explanation could be the higher incarceration rate for black males, but as CPS
data typically excludes institutionalized people, this dierence cannot purely
be explained because of a higher fraction of incarcerated Black males. There
is more variation in the non-participation rates within female groups compared
to within male groups, Hispanic and Asian females being more likely to be
nonparticipating compared to Black and White females, especially before age
45.
To conclude the patterns in the labor market outcomes shown in Figure 2,
we see that unemployment and wage outcomes seem to be negatively corre-
lated: the lower the unemployment rates, the higher the levels and growth rates
of wages tend to be. However, while Hispanic males and females have lower
unemployment rates and higher job-nding rates compared to Black males and
females, their wages age lower. Thus, it seems that even though Hispanics have
relatively better employment outcomes compared to Blacks, their wages seem
not to reect that.
Figure 3 presents average, quarterly transition ows between employment
and unemployment, and employment and non-participation for each, gender-
race pair12. We observe large disparities in the job-nding rates between gender
and racial groups. In general, job-nding rates are the highest for the young
and prime-age workers while the rates start to decline after ages 4045. Overall,
males tend to have higher job-nding rates compared to females, especially
during the prime working years, but Black males' job-nding rates are closer to
female groups than other male groups.
When looking at the job-nding rates for the unemployed, Hispanic and
White males have the highest rates over the whole life cycle compared to any
other group. Between female groups, job-nding rates for unemployed follow
fairly similar patterns for all minority groups while White females have the
highest rates over the whole working life. While Asian females have very strong
labor market outcomes in terms of wages and unemployment, their job-nding
rates are surprisingly low, lowest of all the groups along with Black females.
The greatest dierence between males' and females' job-nding rates for each
race occurs between ages 25 and 45: while males' job-nding rates are at their
highest level for every group, females' job-nding rates slightly decrease. Asian
12As mentioned, we also estimate the transition ows separately for both education levels,
which we use in the calibration.
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Figure 3: Average job nding and destruction rates over the life cycle for dier-
ent demographic groups (CPS 1998-2018).
and Black females have especially low job-nding rates between ages from 30
to 40. We also plot the job nding probabilities for nonparticipants, and very
similar patterns are observed. A notable dierence is that Black females are
having the highest job nding probabilities for nonparticipants among female
groups before age 45. Also, Hispanics and Asian males now have the highest job-
nding rates among males, while Black and White males have almost equal rates
over the life cycle. In addition, nonparticipating Asian females are signicantly
more likely to nd jobs after age 45 when comparing to other female groups.
In general, job-nding probabilities for unemployed are overall higher for all
groups when comparing to job nding probabilities for nonparticipants, which
demonstrates that these two groups should be treated separately.
Figure 3 shows that job destruction rates to unemployment and non-participation
dier greatly with gender. While females are typically more likely to leave em-
ployment to non-participation, especially during the prime working years, this
result reverses when looking at the job destruction rates to unemployment.
Males are more likely to move from employment to unemployment, when com-
paring the rates within race. Job destruction rates to unemployment are higher
early in the life cycle, but stay relatively constant from age 35 until age 55 for
all the groups, except for Blacks, whose job destruction probabilities show a
decreasing trend over the whole life cycle. Both Black males and females are
the most likely groups to move from employment to unemployment, followed
by Hispanics. Young Blacks have especially high likelihood of moving from
employment to unemployment compared to any other group. Females are sig-
nicantly more likely to move from employment to non-participation compared
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to Asian, Hispanic, and White males. For example, young Hispanic females are
about three times more likely to move to non-participation compared to His-
panic males, while White females more than twice as likely compared to White
males. Also, Black males are notably more likely to move to non-participation
compared to other male groups, this result being consistent with the higher
non-participation rate for Black males shown in Figure 2. Black males are al-
most twice as likely to move from employment to non-participation during the
prime working ages compared to White males, and the ows from employment
to non-participation for Black males seem to be somewhat closer to the ones of
Black and White females than the ones of other males. To conclude, females are
more likely to move to non-participation over the life cycle compared to males,
and Blacks have considerably higher job destruction rates compared to other
races.
2.3 Skill Premium, Gender Gaps, and Racial/Ethnic Gaps
Table 1 also reports skill, gender, and race/ethnicity ratios in labor market
outcomes. Skill ratios are calculated as the population-weighted average of the
outcomes of the unskilled relative to the skilled. For example, the wage ratio of
0.6 signify that the unskilled average wage is 60% of the skilled average wage.
Gender ratios similarly refers to the average of females relative to the average of
males, while race/ethnic ratios refers to the average of minorities relative that
of Whites. These ratios provide concise evidence of large gaps among various
demographic groups in a variety of labor market outcomes. In term of average
earnings, the unskilled earns 50% less than the skilled, females earns 43 percent
less than males, and minorities earn 27% less than Whites. This is due gaps
in both wages and employment. The unemployment rate is 50% higher for the
unskilled, 22% lower for females, and 63% higher for minorities.
The last part of Table 1 reports counterfactual eects of eliminating skill,
gender or race/ethnicity gaps, one by one, on the economy-wide averages of
various labor market outcomes. The counterfactual of eliminating gender gaps
assume that females achieve the same labor market outcomes of their male
counter part of the same skill, age and race/ethnicity. The counterfactual of
eliminating the race/ethnicity gap assumes that minority groups achieve the
same labor market outcomes of their White counterpart of the same gender,
age and skill. Finally, the counterfactual of eliminating skills gaps assume that
unskilled individuals achieve the same outcomes of their skilled counterpart of
the same age, gender and race/ethnicity. The potential eects of eliminating
these dierences are signicant. For example, average earnings could increase
by 27% if skills gaps were eliminated, by 20% if gender gaps were eliminated,
and 11% if race/ethnicity gaps were eliminated.
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3 Calibration and Reverse Engineering
3.1 Standard Parameters
We set the model period to be a quarter and the discount rate to be β =
0.9902, which implies that the real interest rate equals 4 percent annually. We
concentrate on workers between ages 25 and 65, and assume that people live
until age 80. Thus, a = 0 (age 25), aR = 163 (age 65), and ā = 319 (age
80). We assume that at age 25, the initial mass one of workers, msi (0, a), is
divided between employment, unemployment, and non-participation so that the
values match the average values for each group i observed in the CPS data
between 19982018. We calibrate the model for 24 types of i: we rst calibrate
the model for 8 dierent gender (male and female) and race (Asian, Black,
Hispanic, and White) groups, and then separately for 16 dierent gender-race-
education groups, where the level of education can be either skilled or non-
skilled. With skilled, we refer to everyone with at least some college education,
while non-skilled group includes workers with high-school degree or less. We set
the elasticity of the matching function, α, to be equal to 0.5, a common value
used in the search literature (e.g., Shimer 2005).
We adopt a simple and common formulation for the consumption while non
employed. Following Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Burdett et. al. (2011),
and Bowlus and Liu (2011) among others, we assume that consumption while
non employed is proportional to the human capital of the individual:
c̄ (x) = γ (x) · h (x) for a < aR,
c̄ (xR) = γ
R · hi (e, aR−1) for a ≥ aR. (22)
This simple formulation can be justied by the fact that unemployment benets
and pensions usually depend on past earnings, and/or non-market activities
also depend on the productivity of the worker. Importantly, the replacement
rate γ (x) is allowed to depend on the state of the worker to account potential
dierent outside options across age, gender, and/or race/ethnicity for example.
The parameter capturing the degree of statistical discrimination, µ, is cali-
brated such that the white/black male ratio of vacancies per unemployed worker
is 1.5, consistent with the ndings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). We
nd that matching that target requires setting µ = 1, which implies that in the
model, rms need to be allowed to accurately use the group-specic job destruc-
tion rates so that the calibration target can be matched. Our baseline model
specication then allows for full statistical discrimination. Section V.I provides
a comparison with the alternative case, µ = 0, and explains in detail why full
statistical discrimination better describes the data in the light of the model.
3.2 Matching Productivities and Human Capital
The main stylized facts that we require the model to exactly replicate are the
life-cycle proles of wages and job nding rates for each group i, as illustrated
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in the rst panel of Figure 2 and panels 1 and 2 of Figure 3. The key equations
for this purpose are (20), (3), (13), and (18).
Given a value of Ji(e, a+ 1), which can be obtained by backward induction
starting at the retirement age, equation (20) provides a connection between job-
nding rates and the ratio A (x) / (κ (x))1−α. Given a series of nding rates, only
partial identication is possible. It is not possible to determine, for example, if
an unusually low nding rate, one that is below what is justied by the value of
the match to the rm, J , may be due to a particularly low matching productivity
or a particularly high cost of posting a vacancy.
We follow the literature in assuming that κ (x) solely depends on the human
capital of the worker so that, for example, it is more costly to hire a skilled
worker than an unskilled worker. In particular, we assume that κ(x) = κ̄h(x)
where κ̄ is a constant. This formulation precludes any discrimination to be
captured by κ (x) since now the cost of hiring a worker only depends on the
true productivity of the worker. The demographic identier, i, does not play
an independent role. This formulation confers a convenient scale invariance, or
balanced growth, property to the model: equilibrium allocations are invariant to
scaling human capitals by a non-negative factor. This can be seen from equation
(20). For example, doubling all human capitals would double the value of rm
with workers, J , but also the cost of hiring workers, κ(x), leaving the tightness
rate unchanged. Equation (20) can be used to solve for A(x) as:
A(x) = f(x)α
(
κ̄h(x)
βJi(e, a+ 1)
)1−α
. (23)
According to this expression, matching eciency reects nding rates and the
cost-benet ratio, κ̄h(x)βJi(e,a+1) , of that particular market x. Labor markets with
unusually low nding rates, but normal cost-benet ratios, are particularly inef-
cient. Any discriminatory behavior in hiring is thus, by construction, captured
in the eciency parameter A(x) as an unusually low matching productivity.
Similarly, markets with normal nding rates but unusually low cost-benet ra-
tios are also particularly inecient. An alternative formulation would be, for
example, to assume A(x) = A for all x, while letting κ (x) adjust to match ob-
served nding rates according to (20). In that case, unusually low nding rates
would be explained by unusually high hiring costs. In conclusion, our esti-
mated matching eciency series, A(x), should be better interpreted as matching
productivities relative to hiring costs.
The calibration of human capital is based on equations (13) and (18). Given
a value of W (x), which can be obtained by backward induction starting at the
retirement age, equation (18) provides a connection between observed wages
and h(x), Θ (x) and/or c̄ (x). Works by Card et. al. (2016) and Isojarvi (2019)
suggests that dierential bargaining powers have modest eects on explaining
wage dierentials. For this reason, we assume identical bargaining power for all
groups, and following the literature we further assume that the Hosios condition
holds so that φi (x) = α = 0.5 and Θ = 1.13 Using this assumption and Equation
13Cordoba et. al. (2020) show that the Hosios condition is a sucient condition for
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(22), Equation (18) can be written as:
(1 + γ (x))h(x) = 2w(x)− βW (x) . (24)
This expression is the basis for the reverse engineering of human capital stocks.
Similarly to the calibrated matching productivity series, only partial identi-
cation of human capital series is possible since wages depend on the join term
(1 + γ (x))h(x), human capital adjusted by its non-market value. This implies
that a particularly low wage may be due to a particularly low human capital
of the worker, but also could be due to a particularly non-market valuation of
the worker's human capital which weakens the workers position during wage
negotiations.
Our benchmark calibration assumes γ (x) = γ so that all wage dierentials
are fully attributed to human capital dierentials. This choice reects the tradi-
tional view on wages as primarily reecting the true productivity of the workers.
We calibrate γ such that the average consumption during unemployment in the
model is about 40 percent of the average consumption for the employed, follow-
ing Shimer (2005). The calibrated value of γ is found to be 0.35. We choose
γR = 0.33, which implies that the average consumption during retirement is
about 50 percent of the average human capital at the age of the retirement.
Our results are robust to dierent plausible values of γR. Given γ (x) and ob-
served series of wages, w(x), Equation (24) can be used to obtain human capital
series, and Equation (1) could be used to obtain yi and r(x) as yi = h(0, 0, i, E)
and r(x) = 1e
lnh(x)
yi
.
An implication of assuming γ (x) = γ is that any discriminatory behavior
aecting wages will not be attributed at all to discrimination outside the labor
market. Only discrimination during hiring and in the work place could be
captured by the benchmark. Specically, any discrimination in hiring would
be included as part of the calibrated values of A(x) and aect wages through
the term W (x). Discrimination in the work place would be incorporated as
part of the human capital series, particularly in the returns to experience, r(x).
In fact, the traditional interpretation of dierences in returns to experience
obtained from Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions is that they reect some type
of discrimination. The robustness section, Section 5, considers an alternative
identication approach that allows discrimination outside the labor market to
aect wages. It assumes common returns to experience across groups and uses
Equation (24) to back up series of γ (x) rather than series of human capital.
As we only observe average job-nding rates and average wages for every
age, but not for every level of experience, we actually use the model's analytical
averages to match the corresponding data. In practice, the data restrictions
imply that we can only recover A(x) = Ai(a, s) and r(x) = ri(a). Details of
the calibration strategy are provided in Appendices C and D, along with the
calibration algorithm. To further clarify the interpretation of the dierences
decentralized markets to be ecient even in the presence of learning by doing and non-
participation. As mentioned in Footnote 7, our allocations are not fully ecient since we
assume, for tractability, that unemployment is the only outside option during bargaining.
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in job-nding rates between unemployed and nonparticipant, we calibrate the
search eort for nonparticipants, ψi(a).14 To do that, we need an additional
restriction. We assume that the general matching eciency is equal for both
unemployed and nonparticipants, Ai(a, Ū) = Ai(a, N̄) = Ai(a), which then
implies that ψi(a) captures unexplained dierences in job-nding rates between
unemployed and nonparticipants.
3.3 Calibration results, 19982018
3.3.1 Human capital
Figure 4 displays average reverse-engineered human capital, average wage, av-
erage experience and average returns to experience proles over the life cycle
for eight demographic groups.15 As described earlier, human capital proles are
obtained such that the model exactly matches average life-cycle wages. Pre-
market, or schooling, human capital, yi, is depicted by the initial human capital
levels at age 25, while the returns to experience, ri(a), are reected in the hu-
man capital growth rates over the life cycle. Wedges in initial human capital
and returns to experience could reect dierential occupational choices but also
discrimination. They could be interpreted as occupational wedges: a represen-
tative worker in each demographic group chooses an occupation with a dierent
level of initial skills and future human capital growth rate. For example, a
worker with a lower level of education is likely predetermined to have a low
initial human capital and human capital growth rate in the future. However,
returns to experience can also capture discrimination to some extent: returns
to experience are closely connected to promotions over the career, and if certain
demographic groups are discriminated in promotions, that would be captured
in the calibrated returns to experience.
Partial validation of the calibrated human capital proles is provided by
the results obtained for White males, the case most studied in the literature.
The calibrated average human capital prole is closely associated to average
wages during most of the life-cycle until around age 55. In particular, human
capital starts low, grows faster for young workers, and the growth slows down
over the life cycle. Our series for White males is roughly consistent with the
ones obtained by other search models that also nd a close association between
wages and human capital (Bowless and Liu, 2013, pg 306). The association
is not perfect, however. First, wages grow faster than human capitals, until
around age 50, reecting improving labor market conditions over the life-cycle,
such as lowering separation rates and increasing nding rates. Second, human
capitals do not exhibit a clear inverted-U shape of wages. In fact, the model
predicts a divergent path of wages and human capital after age 55, with wages
falling while human capital still increasing. The fall in wages reects the eect
of a nite working life which gradually reduces the surplus of the match, and
14Search eort of all unemployed groups is assumed to be equal to 1.
15See Appendix C for the dis-aggregated results for college and non-college groups. The
ndings described in this Section are generally robust to the disaggregation.
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Figure 4: Average wage, human capital, experience, and returns to experience
proles over the life cycle, relative to the wage of 25 year old average White
male.
therefore wages, as the worker approaches retirement. This feature is consistent
with similar life-cycle search models, such as Hairault et. al. (2007), Cheron et.
al. (2013), or Menzio et al. (2016). A rising human capital is needed to partly
oset the nite-horizon eect and avoid wages falling too rapidly. The model
thus implies that White males are most productive just before retirement, in
spite of their falling wages.16 The signicant but not perfect association between
wages and human capital signies that search frictions play an important but
not crucial role in wage determination. All in all, our calibrated human capital
prole for White males is consistent with existing results in the literature.
Figure 4 displays human capital estimates for other, less studied, demo-
graphic groups. These proles exhibit similar properties as those of White males:
(i) human capital follow wages to a large extent until age 55; (ii) wages tend to
grow faster than human capital early in the life cycle; and (iii) human capital
and wages tend to diverge after age 55. We nd signicant variation in human
capital proles along all demographic dimensions: age, education, gender, and
race/ethnicity. Within race/ethnicity, males have higher levels of human capi-
tal over the life cycle compared to females. But there are two sub-periods with
markedly dierent evolution. Early in the life-cycle and up to around age 33,
female human capitals grow faster than that of males (see Figure 3.d), and in
the case of Hispanics, females actually have more human capital than males on
average. Such convergence in human capitals across genders is not reected in
16An increasing human capital at the end of the life cycle in our model plays an analogous
role to the fall in reservation productivity considered by Cheron et. al. 2013).
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wages partly because of the slowly weakening female labor market as job sepa-
ration rates increase. Females then face stagnating or declining human capital
between ages 35 and 50 likely related to career breaks: as many women leave
the labor market during prime working ages due to family and other reasons,
the average human capital for those groups is lower. The opening gap after
age 35 is due to an increasing gap in experience (Figure 4.c) but also due to a
decline in the returns to experience (Figure 4.d).
Within gender, we also nd fairly large dierences in human capital proles
for dierent races/ethnicities which increase over the life cycle. Asian males have
the highest human capital until age 55, when White males take the lead. Black
and Hispanic males have signicantly lower human capital levels compared to
Asian and White males, Blacks having somewhat higher human capital com-
pared to Hispanic males although their wages are similar. Asian females have
the highest human capital over the life cycle compared to other females groups,
followed by White females. Again, Black and Hispanic females have fairly simi-
lar human capital levels over the life cycle, but signicantly lower compared to
Asian and White females. The racial gaps in human capital are however smaller
for women than for men. Black males average experience is atypical of males
and driven by their unusual high job separation rates and low job-nding rates.
They also have unusually lower returns to experience early in the life-cycle.
It is worth noting that the life cycle human capital proles for Asians are
distinct from all other groups. Their human capital start from a signicantly
higher level and grow rapidly until age 35 for females and age 40 for males.
However, unlike for other groups, their human capital start decreasing after
that. There are at least two possible explanations. First, the shape of the
human capital could capture cohort eects: it is possible that earlier cohorts
in skilled Asian groups were choosing dierent occupations with very dierent
returns to experience. This could show as a relative decrease in human capital
for older workers: since older workers in the data represent more heavily older
cohorts, this cohort eect could explain the pattern. We study this eect by
running our results for two dierent time periods: 19892018 and 19982018.
Our hypothesis is that if the cohort eect is strong, the results should be dierent
between these two time periods, as 19892018 periods include older cohorts.
However, we do not nd this to be the case which implies that there are likely
to other explanations. Another possible reason could be that skilled Asians face
relatively more obstacles in terms of promotions. There are some evidence on
that: while Asians are the most educated group (50.6 % of 25 years or older
has at least Bachelor's degree compared to the national average 30.1 %), they
are the least likely group to be promoted to managerial positions and they are
not well represented in executive positions (Gee & Peck 2017, EEOC 2019). An
exclusion of Asians from the highest paid positions could then show up as a
stagnating wages and human capital in the data.
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3.3.2 Matching eciency
We next present the reverse-engineered matching eciencies, A(x). Dierences
in matching eciencies across labor markets reect dierences in job-nding
rates that cannot be explained by the dierences in fundamentals: match values
and vacancy posting costs. Examples of factors that can aect A(x) include ge-
ography, hiring practices, search intensity, and/or regulations specic to a type
x. Wedges in matching eciencies can also capture taste-based discrimination or
prejudices in the labor market aecting the job-nding rates of dierent demo-
graphic groups. The results in this section are related to those of Barnichon and
Figura (2015) and Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) who also study matching
eciency under heterogeneity and segmented markets. But while they focus on
aggregate business cycle properties, our focus is on life-cycle and demographic
features.
Figure 5 shows the job-nding rates for the unemployed and the reverse-
engineered matching eciencies of the unemployed. At rst glance, the cali-
brated eciency proles resemble to a large extent the proles of the job-nding
rates, an impression that is largely shaped by the results for Hispanic males
and, to a lesser extent, for Black females. These two groups exhibit the highest
and the lowest nding rates, respectively, and also end up being the ones with
the highest and lowest matching eciencies.17Thus, simple cost/benet analysis
cannot fully explain these outermost nding rates without signicant dierences
in matching eciency. A closer look at the calibrated proles reveal, however, a
more complex relationship. In particular, various of the large systematic gaps in
nding rates do not translate into large systematic gaps in matching eciencies.
We next summarize some salient features of the calibrated matching eciencies.
First, while job-nding rates trend downward over the life-cycle for all groups,
matching eciencies are atter for various groups. This is particularly clear for
White males and White females, as well as Hispanic females. In those cases,
the falling nding rates over the life-cycle are explained largely by the declining
value of the match as the end of the match approaches. A strong downward
trend in matching eciency is clear for Hispanic and Asian males, and less
strong but clear for Black males. For those groups, age discrimination may
play an important role. Second, in spite of their lower nding rates, matching
eciency is relatively high for Hispanic females and Asian males.
Our third observation relates to gender gaps. Similarly to human capital
gaps, males tend to have higher matching eciencies within race compared to
females. This is especially pronounced for younger workers. Gender gaps in
matching eciency increase and then fall over the life-cycle. Hispanics have the
widest gender gap among race/ethnicity, followed by Asians, Blacks and Whites
respectively. The gender gap for Whites is small and disappears at around age
40. Finally, when it comes to racial/ethnic dierences in matching eciency,
17A possible alternative explanation for the high nding rates of Hispanics would be that
they have weaker outside options depending on legal status and language barriers. Although
a weaker outside option could explain the particularly low wage rate of Hispanic, still a high
matching eciency will be required. See Section V for details.
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Figure 5: Average job nding rate and matching eciency proles over the life
cycle.
Hispanics have the highest matching eciency over the life cycle. Within males,
Hispanics have signicantly higher A compared to other male groups. They are
followed by Asians, Whites, and Blacks, but the racial dierences are more
modest between those three groups. When it comes to females, White females
have the second highest matching eciencies over the life cycle, while Asians
and Blacks have lower but fairly similar matching eciencies.
The calibrated matching eciencies suggest mixed results for the potential
role of taste-based discrimination during hiring. On the one hand, minority
groups such as Hispanics and Asian males exhibit particularly high matching
eciencies. On the other hand, there is a persistent but narrow eciency gap
among Black and White males and a larger and persistent gap between Black
and White females and Asian and White females. As it will become clear in
the counterfactual exercises below, the reason why White males do not exhibit a
particularly high matching eciency, in spite of their observed high nding rates,
is their lower separation rates and higher returns to experience. Everything
else the same, prot maximizing rms would naturally post more vacancies for
workers with lower separation rates and higher returns to experience.
We further reverse engineer the search eort for nonparticipants, ψN̄i (a),
over the life cycle, and the detailed results are presented in the Appendix. To
summarize the results, the search eort is higher for younger workers and it
decreases with age for most of the groups, consistent with the intuition that
young workers are more actively attached to labor market. The search eort is
also typically higher for males than females, and lowest for Whites. This last
result is needed for the model to account for the fact that job-nding rates,
out of non-participation, tend to be lower for Whites in spite of their lower
separation rates and higher returns to experience which should have induced
nding rates to be higher than normal.
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4 Decomposition
In this section, we assess the quantitative role of the calibrated parametric
wedges in accounting for dierences in labor market outcomes as well as in their
macroeconomic signicance. We consider four set of counterfactuals: one that
eliminates all gaps simultaneously, one that eliminates gender gaps only, one
that eliminates race/ethnic gaps only, and one that eliminates educational gaps
only. In each counterfactual, we close the wedges in exogenous variables, one
by one, between the comparison group and the baseline, or reference, group,
and calculate the eect on labor market outcomes. This decomposition informs
us about the relative importance of each exogenous variable in accounting for
labor market disparities. Workers can dier along 9 dimensions: human capi-
tal parameters (y(x), r(x)), matching eciencies (A(x), ψ(x)), exogenous labor
market ows (πEN (x), πEU (x), πUN (x), πNU (x)), and initial mass distribution
among each employment status, s, at the beginning of their life cycle (msi (0, a)).
Aggregate impacts are calculated as weighted averages of the dis-aggregated
impacts using each group's population share in 2018 as a weight. For more pre-
cision, we use the calibrated parameters for the skilled/unskilled categories, as
reported in the Appendix, rather than the just the aggregate categories reported
in Section 3.18
We also assess the quantitative importance of statistical discrimination by
running a counterfactual in which µ is set to 0. This prevents rms and workers
from using group-specic job destruction rates when deciding vacancy creation
and when negotiating wages. They use instead job separation rates of the cor-
responding reference group in the counterfactual.19
In order to deal with gaps that are close to zero, we report absolute con-
tributions rather than simple contributions. To illustrate the issue, and the
solution, consider the decomposition of the unemployment gap shown in the
four panel of Figure 6. Since some of the gaps, relative to the reference group,
are close to zero, and since some of the underlying explanatory factors have a
positive impact while others have a negative impact on the gap, the percentage
contribution of individual factors could result in gures like +150%, +50% and
-100%. Values like these would suggest a relative importance of each individual
factor but the exact ranking is sometimes unclear. In order to keep individual
contributions bounded by 100% and adding to 100%, we dene the absolute
contribution as the value of the raw contribution relative to sum of the raw con-
tributions in absolute values. In the example above, the absolute contributions
are 150/300=50%, 50/300=16.6% and -100/300=-33.3%. The absolute values
of these contributions add to 100%. This methodology is helpful as it indicates
18The results are qualitative similar if only aggregate categories, as described in Section
3, are utilized. Quantitatively, the results reported in this section, based on the more dis-
aggregated categories, provide a larger role for initial human capitals and a lesser role for job
separation rates.
19The exercise is dierent from the one carried out for the non-statistical discrimination
model (NSD) described in section 5. This section uses the calibrated parameters of the SD
model (µ = 1) to assess what happens if µ is set to zero so that rms cannot statistically
discriminate based on job separation probabilities.
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that the rst factor is the main determinant of the gap, while the third factor
is the second most important determinant, although its contribution is nega-
tive. The proposed methodology aects how accounting results are reported
for variables such as unemployment, tightness, and nding rates but has minor
impact on other variables such wages, employment or life-time earnings. For
completeness, the tables also report the raw values.
4.1 Skilled White Male Premium
Our rst counterfactual exercise uses Skilled White Males (WMS) of the same
age as the reference group. We then equate, one by one, all the parameters of
other groups to the values of the reference group, and assess their individual
impact. This exercise eliminates a number of gaps simultaneously: educational
gaps, gender gaps, and race/ethnicity gaps. It also provides an upper bound for
the potential aggregate gains of eliminating all types of labor market dispari-
ties, frictions and/or discrimination. Figure 6 shows the decomposition results
for six variables and all demographic groups. The dots in the graps are the
observed gaps. Table 2 reports corresponding decomposition results for selected
labor market variables. The rst row of the table shows average observed gaps
while the second row shows the explained gaps calculated as the sum of the
individual eects listed in the table. The unexplained part of the gap is due to
interactions between individual components. The rst part of the table shows
the decomposition results in levels, while the second parts reports the percent-
age contributions to the explained gap, including the estimated contribution of
statistical discrimination.
Consider rst the determinants of wage gaps. Figure 6 and Table 2 show
that wage gaps arise primarily from the dierences in human capital param-
eters, y(x) and r(x). Dierences in these two sets of parameters account for
around three fourths of the average explained wage gaps, with dierences in
initial human capitals accounting for around half of the explained wage gap.
Search parameters accounts for the remaining one fourth of the explained wag
gap. This split is similar to other ndings in the search literature. For example,
Bowlus and Liu (2014, pg 305) nd that human capital accumulation accounts
for 50% of total earnings growth, job search accounts for 20%, and the remaining
30% is due to the interactions of the two. Our corresponding decomposition,
taking into account that the explained gap is 77% of the actual wage gap, are
57%, 20% and 23%. The similarity of the split is perhaps reassuring given that
Bowlus and Liu focus on wage growth of White males, rather than wage dis-
persion among demographic groups, use a dierent human capital mechanism,
Ben Porath rather than learning-by-doing, and employ NLSY79 data rather
than CPS. The key role of human capital variables reect the fact that the ref-
erence group, Skilled White Males, generally display higher educational levels
and higher average returns to experience, with the exception of Asian groups,
which exhibit a signicantly larger initial human capital but also signicantly
lower average returns to experience than the reference group. In general, the
explained components of the gaps is around 80% in the decompositions that
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Figure 6: Decomposition Skilled White Male Premium
follow. For that reason, we focus our comments on the decomposition of the
explained components.
The third most important wedge in accounting for the explained wage gaps
is in the job destruction rate to non-participation (πEN ). This wedge alone
accounts for around 19% of the explained wage gaps. Part of this eect comes
from the fact that a high πEN is directly related to career interruptions, lower
experience, and slower accumulation of human capital. But the majority comes
from the fact that a high πEN weakens a worker's outside option in the wage
bargaining, leading to a lower wage. We will return to this result when analyzing
the role of statistical discrimination below.
Consider next the determinants of other labor market outcomes. Gaps in
employment and non-participation rates are largely driven by the wedges in
separation rates, mainly in πEN although wedges inπEU also play a signicant
role. High separation rates directly leads to lower employment and higher non-
participation, but it is also the major determinant of the dierences in the proba-
bility of moving back to employment, as seen when looking at the decomposition
for the labor market tightness and the job nding rate of the unemployed, θU
and πUE respectively. The second most important wedge is in returns to ex-
perience, r(x), particularly aecting tightness and nding rates. These returns
are key for vacancy posting as they determine the expected long-term prospects
of a match. Notice that while dierences in initial human capitals are key for
wage gaps, they play no role in explaining gaps in other labor variables such
as employment, tightness or nding rates. The reason is that, as discussed in
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Table 2: Decomposition Skilled White Male Premium
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Average gap (weighted) 10.34 13.6% ‐0.9% 12.7% ‐12.7% 20.2% 7.9% 4.3% 2.0% 37.74
Explained gap 8.01 14.9% ‐0.2% 14.7% ‐14.7% 19.3% 8.0% 4.4% 2.5% 28.12
Initial human capital (y ) 3.81 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.14
Matching productivity (A ) ‐0.05 ‐0.5% 0.2% ‐0.3% 0.3% ‐0.7% ‐0.1% ‐1.7% ‐0.4% ‐0.24
Search‐effort nonpartcipans () 0.18 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% ‐2.0% ‐2.3% 2.5% ‐0.7% 1.9% 1.13
Returns to experience (r) 2.18 1.2% ‐0.2% 1.0% ‐1.0% 9.6% 3.0% 3.1% 0.9% 8.46
Separation rate to Unempl. (EU) 0.23 1.3% ‐0.7% 0.6% ‐0.6% 1.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.2% 0.84
Separation rate to Non‐p. (EN) 1.52 10.4% ‐0.5% 9.9% ‐9.9% 14.8% 3.7% 4.5% 0.5% 7.38
Flow Unempl. To Non‐p.  (UN) 0.11 ‐0.2% 0.7% 0.5% ‐0.5% ‐3.8% ‐1.4% ‐1.3% ‐0.5% 0.11
Flow Non‐p. to Unempl. (UN) 0.04 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% ‐0.8% ‐0.2% ‐0.2% ‐0.1% ‐0.1% 0.25
Initial distribution of pop. (m0) 0.01 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% ‐0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.05
 1.23 2.4% ‐0.3% 2.1% ‐2.1% 18.2% 6.2% 5.5% 1.8% 6.90
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Initial human capital (y) 46.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.5%
Returns to experience (r) 26.8% 7.4% 7.3% 6.4% 6.4% 28.7% 25.8% 26.2% 20.1% 29.6%
Matching productivity (A ) ‐0.6% ‐3.1% ‐5.9% ‐2.2% ‐2.2% ‐2.1% ‐1.1% ‐14.3% ‐8.9% ‐0.8%
Search‐effort nonparticipants () 2.2% 12.4% ‐0.5% 13.1% 13.1% ‐6.9% 21.7% ‐6.0% 42.4% 4.0%
To unemploymentEU) 2.8% 8.2% 27.0% 3.9% 3.9% 5.6% 4.8% 4.5% 3.5% 2.9%
To nonparticipationEN) 18.7% 64.2% 18.3% 64.7% 64.7% 44.6% 32.3% 37.9% 11.7% 25.8%
UN 1.3% ‐1.0% ‐25.4% 3.3% 3.3% ‐11.5% ‐12.2% ‐10.7% ‐11.0% 0.4%
NU 0.5% 2.6% ‐15.3% 5.4% 5.4% ‐0.5% ‐1.7% ‐0.4% ‐1.7% 0.9%
m0 0.1% 1.1% 0.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% ‐0.4% 0.0% ‐0.8% 0.2%
Sum absolute contributions 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Contribution 15.2% 14.6% 12.6% 13.5% 13.5% 54.6% 53.8% 47.0% 41.1% 24.1%
As share of d 70.5% 20.2% 27.8% 19.7% 19.7% 108.7% 145.0% 110.9% 270.9% 84.0%
Statistical discrimination
Others
Table 2: Decomposition All Gaps: labor market gaps relative to Skilled White Males 2016
Absolute Contributions
Human Capital 
Matching Efficiency
Separation rates (d)
Section 3.3, the model is scale invariant in human capitals levels.
Interestingly, equating the matching eciencies in the unemployed pool,
A(x), to that of the reference group would actually further increase most la-
bor markets gaps. The reason is that the calibrated matching eciency for
Skilled White Males is more on the average level while some groups, such as
Asian and Hispanics, tend to exhibit higher matching eciency. However, the
reference group enjoys a signicant higher matching productivity out of the non-
participating pool, ψ(x), which explains 42% of the gap in nding rates out of
the nonparticipating pool. The role of taste-based discrimination in hiring thus
seems limited when considering the unemployed but maybe signicant for the
nonparticipants.
The key labor market outcome of the model is the average life-time earnings
of workers, W (x), as dened by equation (9). This average welfare measure
takes into account all the wage and employment information of the worker.20
The decomposition results for the average W somewhat follows closely the de-
composition results for wages, emphasizing the roles of human capital param-
eters and πEN . However, as W depend closely on both life-cycle wages and
employment, the role of πEN is greater and the role of yi is smaller in gener-
ating these gaps compared to the wage gap decomposition. We nd that, from
20Since a period in the model is a quarter, W is measured in quarters of earnings.
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the point of view of average life-time earnings, W , human capital dierences
accounts for 50% of total earnings disparities, job search accounts for 25%, and
the remaining 25% is due to the interactions of the two.
Finally, we investigate the role of statistical discrimination in generating the
gaps. For this purpose we set µ = 0 which equates the separation rates of
all groups to the reference group but only for job posting and wage bargain-
ing decisions. Actual separation rates are still used when calculating job ows
into unemployment and non-participation, what we call the direct channel. We
nd that statistical discrimination explains the majority of the impact that
comes through job separation rates when looking at the wage, tightness rate,
job nding rate, and welfare gaps. Around 70% of the role of πEU and πEN in
generating wage gaps arises from rms' dierential treatment of groups based on
their job destruction rates, while the rest is coming through the direct channel.
According to the model, higher job destruction probabilities lowers a worker's
outside option in the wage negotiation, leading to lower wages. Around half of
the gaps in labor market tightnesses and job-nding rates can be explained by
the statistical discrimination, according to the model. Firms post less vacancies
to workers with higher job destruction rates. Around 24 percent of the over-
all welfare gaps over the life cycle are coming through discrimination channel.
The contribution of statistical discrimination is smaller when looking at the em-
ployment and non-participation outcomes as these outcomes depend closely on
the direct channel aecting the employment masses. The rest of the impact is
coming through the discrimination channel aecting a worker's job nding rate.
In contrast to the role of taste-based discrimination, we nd a potentially
signicant role for statistical discrimination in explaining the aggregate out-
comes gaps between dierent educational groups, genders and race/ethnicity.
According to Tables 2, statistical discrimination alone could explain between
12-15% of wage, employment, unemployment and non-participation gaps, and
around half the gaps in labor market tightnesses, and job-nding rates. The
impacts on life-cycle welfare gaps are also large, of around 24% percent.
4.2 Skill Gaps / Skill Premium
Our second exercise decomposes the sources of skill gaps, or skill premium. They
are gaps in labor market outcomes between skilled and unskilled individuals of
the same gender, race/ethnicity and age. As shown in Table 1, gaps between
the skilled and unskilled are the larger component of all gaps. They represents
46%, 42% and 40% of the overall explained gaps in wages, life-time earnings
and employment respectively.
The results of the decomposition are shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. The
exercise uses skilled individuals of the same gender, race/ethnicity and age as the
reference group. As expected, the two human capital variables, initial human
capitals and returns to experience, accounts for most of the skill premium in
wages and life-time earnings, 83% and 74% respectively, and for between 26%
to 34% of the corresponding premiums in job nding and tightness rates. Initial
human capital is the dominant factor accounting for around 60% of the skill
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Figure 7: Decomposition Skill Gaps
wage premium and for around 50% of the premium in life-time earnings.
But an important share of skill premiums are explained by search frictions,
in particular by wedges in separation rates. The lower separation rates of skilled
workers account for 12.7%, 61% and 18% of the premiums in wages, employ-
ment, and life-time earnings respectively. Statistical discrimination accounts,
according to the model, for 9.3%, 13.5% and 15.2% of skill premiums in wages,
employment, and life-time earnings, and between 22% to 47% of the skill pre-
miums in job nding and tightness rates.
These accounting results indicate that higher human capitals, the ability of
the worker to generate output, is the main reason why skilled workers enjoy
labor market premiums. But it is not the only reason. Skill premiums also
reect lower search frictions and statistical discrimination that favors skilled
workers.
4.3 Gender Gaps / Male Premium
Gender gaps are the second larger of all gaps. According to Table 1, they ac-
count for 29%, 31% and 51% of the overall explained gaps in wages, life-time
earnings and employment respectively. The decomposition results, shown in
Figure 8 and Table 4, suggests similar roles for human capital and search fric-
tions in explaining gender gaps in wage and life-time earnings, of 54% and 46%
respectively, but a minimum role for human capital variables in explaining the
signicant gender gaps in employment, job nding, and tightness rates. Sepa-
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Table 3: Decomposition - Skill Gap
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Average gap (weighted) 4.73 5.6% ‐0.5% 5.0% ‐5.0% 7.4% 4.7% 0.6% 1.5% 15.75
Explained gap 3.92 5.7% ‐0.3% 5.3% ‐5.3% 7.4% 4.1% 0.8% 1.5% 12.58
Initial human capital (y ) 2.45 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.51
Matching productivity (A ) ‐0.09 ‐0.7% 0.2% ‐0.6% 0.6% ‐0.9% ‐0.3% ‐1.9% ‐0.6% ‐0.37
Search‐effort nonpartcipans () 0.07 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% ‐1.3% ‐1.1% 1.7% ‐0.4% 1.4% 0.65
Returns to experience (r) 0.96 0.6% ‐0.1% 0.5% ‐0.5% 4.7% 1.3% 1.6% 0.4% 3.34
Separation rate to Unempl. (EU) 0.16 1.0% ‐0.5% 0.5% ‐0.5% 1.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.57
Separation rate to Non‐p. (EN) 0.34 3.4% ‐0.2% 3.2% ‐3.2% 4.4% 1.2% 1.5% 0.3% 1.76
Flow Unempl. To Non‐p.  (UN) 0.03 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% ‐0.2% ‐0.9% ‐0.3% ‐0.3% ‐0.1% 0.03
Flow Non‐p. to Unempl. (UN) 0.00 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% ‐0.2% ‐0.2% 0.0% ‐0.1% 0.0% 0.06
Initial distribution of pop. (m0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.01 ‐0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.02
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Initial human capital (y) 59.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 48.9%
Returns to experience (r) 23.3% 8.5% ‐8.5% 7.7% ‐7.7% 34.8% 24.4% 25.9% 13.8% 25.1%
Matching productivity (A ) ‐2.1% ‐10.2% 13.5% ‐8.9% 8.9% ‐6.6% ‐5.9% ‐30.2% ‐21.0% ‐2.8%
Search‐effort nonpartcipants () 1.7% 17.6% ‐0.3% 19.7% ‐19.7% ‐8.0% 32.7% ‐6.0% 46.6% 4.9%
To unemploymentEU) 3.9% 13.5% ‐40.4% 7.3% ‐7.3% 10.4% 7.5% 7.0% 3.5% 4.3%
To nonparticipationEN) 8.2% 47.2% ‐13.9% 49.8% ‐49.8% 32.1% 23.2% 23.8% 10.5% 13.2%
UN 0.6% ‐0.4% 14.1% 2.3% ‐2.3% ‐6.5% ‐5.6% ‐4.8% ‐3.4% 0.2%
NU 0.1% 1.5% 8.8% 3.3% ‐3.3% ‐1.5% 0.6% ‐2.2% 1.1% 0.4%
m0 0.1% 1.3% ‐0.5% 1.0% ‐1.0% 0.0% ‐0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
sum absolute contributions 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Contribution 9.3% 13.5% ‐11.0% 12.9% ‐12.9% 46.9% 38.4% 34.4% 22.6% 15.2%
As share of d 76.7% 22.2% 20.3% 22.7% 22.7% 110.3% 125.2% 111.5% 161.2% 87.0%
Others
Statistical discrimination
Table 3: Decomposition Skills Gap: labor market gaps relative to Skilled  Individuals of same Gender and Race/Ethnicity 2016
Absolute Contributions
Human Capital
Matching Efficiency
Separation rates (d)
ration rates to non-participation (πEN ) are either the major or a major factor
explaining gender gaps, and most this role enters through statistical discrimi-
nation. The respective contributions of πEN and statistical discrimination are:
for wages, 29% and 16%; for employment, 59% and 10%; for life-time earnings,
36% and 25%; for nding rates of the unemployed 36% and 32%; for the tight-
ness rate of the unemployed, 49% and 44%; and for the tightness rate of the
nonparticipants, 32% and 38%.
Hsieh et. al. (2019) wonder why justice O'Connor, like many women in the
1950's, had diculties nding a job early in her career, despite being ranked
third in her class at Stanford Law School. Justice Ginsburg faced similar di-
culties. A simple model of career choice, like the Roy model used by Hsieh et.
al., would have problems rationalizing high unemployment rates of high-skilled
willing-to-work women, just like the justices. Our search model with statis-
tical discrimination can rationalize these situations. According to the model,
if separation rates are high among skilled women, which was the case in the
1950's, then all sort of labor market outcomes are eected for skilled woment,
particularly job-nding and unemployment rates.
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Figure 8: Decomposition Gender Gaps
4.4 Race-Ethnic Gaps / White Premium
Race/ethnic gaps are the third larger of all gaps. According to Table 1, they
account for around 11-13% of the overall gaps in wages, life-time earnings and
employment respectively. The decomposition results, shown in Figure 9 and
Table 5, suggest a strong role for human capital, particularly for returns to
experience, and separation rates in explaining race/ethnic gaps. Human capital
explains 61% and 48% of the wage and life-time earnings gaps, and 17% and
22% of the racial gaps in job nding and tightness rate of the unemployed.
Separation rates and statistical discrimination explain, respectively, 30.5%
and 22.7% of the racial wage gap, 35% and 30.8% of the life-time earnings racial
gap, 60% and 14% of the employment racial gap, 49% and 54% of the racial
gap in the tightness rate of the unemployed, and 38% and 41% of the gap in
ndings rate of the unemployed.
These aggregate results hide some important dierences among race/ethnic
groups. As shown in Figure 9, lower matching eciency is an important con-
tributor of the lower job-nding rate of the unemployed, and other gaps in
employment variables, particularly for unskilled Black males and skilled Asian
females. The decomposition thus suggests that prejudice in hiring may be an im-
portant determinant of employment gaps for these groups. On the other hand,
Hispanic groups, with the exception of skilled Hispanic females, and unskilled
Asian females, exhibit particularly high matching eciencies. These results sug-
gest reverse prejudice as employers may actually prefer certain minority groups
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Table 4: Decomposition Gender Gaps
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Average gap (weighted) 3.03 6.9% 0.4% 7.3% ‐7.3% 5.2% 2.8% 3.3% 1.7% 11.56
Explained gap 2.84 8.0% 0.7% 8.7% ‐8.7% 5.9% 3.4% 3.4% 2.1% 10.62
Initial human capital (y ) 1.17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.14
Matching productivity (A ) 0.14 1.0% ‐0.1% 0.9% ‐0.9% 1.0% 0.3% 2.0% 0.6% 0.48
Search‐effort nonpartcipans () 0.16 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% ‐1.4% ‐1.8% 1.9% ‐0.5% 1.5% 0.87
Returns to experience (r) 0.47 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% ‐0.2% 2.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 2.07
Separation rate to Unempl. (EU) ‐0.10 ‐0.6% 0.2% ‐0.4% 0.4% ‐0.7% ‐0.3% ‐0.3% ‐0.1% ‐0.37
Separation rate to Non‐p. (EN) 0.89 5.6% ‐0.2% 5.4% ‐5.4% 8.3% 2.1% 2.5% 0.4% 4.12
Flow Unempl. To Non‐p.  (UN) 0.07 ‐0.1% 0.4% 0.2% ‐0.2% ‐2.6% ‐0.9% ‐0.8% ‐0.3% 0.05
Flow Non‐p. to Unempl. (UN) 0.04 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% ‐0.9% ‐0.3% ‐0.2% ‐0.1% ‐0.1% 0.23
Initial distribution of pop. (m0) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
 0.49 0.01 0.00 0.01 ‐0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.87
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Initial human capital (y) 38.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.6%
Returns to experience (r) 15.3% 2.7% ‐2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 12.0% 9.9% 8.9% 6.0% 18.2%
Matching productivity (A ) 4.7% 10.8% ‐7.9% 9.6% 9.6% 6.2% 4.4% 29.7% 20.1% 4.3%
Search‐effort nonpartcipants () 5.2% 14.5% ‐0.5% 14.5% 14.5% ‐10.5% 30.2% ‐8.0% 46.8% 7.7%
To unemploymentEU) ‐3.3% ‐6.3% 16.3% ‐3.8% ‐3.8% ‐4.5% ‐4.5% ‐4.0% ‐2.5% ‐3.3%
To nonparticipationEN) 29.4% 58.9% ‐14.9% 56.9% 56.9% 49.3% 32.4% 36.0% 11.4% 36.2%
UN 2.3% ‐1.5% 24.9% 2.5% 2.5% ‐15.7% ‐14.3% ‐12.2% ‐9.7% 0.4%
NU 1.2% 4.1% 33.6% 9.3% 9.3% ‐1.9% ‐3.7% ‐1.2% ‐3.4% 2.0%
m0 0.2% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% ‐0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Sum absolute contributions 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Contribution 16.0% 10.2% ‐7.6% 9.3% 9.3% 43.9% 38.3% 32.6% 22.6% 25.3%
As share of d 61.4% 19.3% ‐554.4% 17.6% 17.6% 97.9% 137.3% 101.6% 254.6% 76.8%
Separation Rates (d)
Others
Statistical discrimination
Table 4: Decomposition Gender Gap: relative to Males of same Skills and Race/Ethnicity ‐ 2016
Absolute Contributions  (Absolute values add to 100%)
Human Capital
Matching Efficiency
for certain tasks. The overall potential eect of prejudice in hiring is relatively
secondary according to our decomposition.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) provide compelling evidence that race
matters for hiring decisions. Everything else the same, Whites received around
50%more callbacks for interviews in their eld experiment. What is the source of
this dierence? Our exercise sheds some light. According to our model, there are
three set of reasons why some individuals are more employable than others: (i)
higher human capital; (ii) prejudice in hiring; and (iii) statistical discrimination.
Our quantitative exercise suggests that human capital dierences, in particular
in returns to experience, and statistical discrimination explains most of the
gap. Prejudice in hiring is of secondary importance on average, but potentially
important for certaint groups. For example, our disaggregated results show that
prejudice could explain up to 10% of lower job-nding rate of unskilled Black
males relative to unskilled White males.
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Figure 9: Decomposition Race Gaps
5 Robustness checks
This section provides further support to the use of benchmark model by consid-
ering two alternative calibrations of the model. The rst alternative precludes
any statistical discrimination from occurring, while the second alternative allows
workers' outside options, the non-market compensations, to vary across demo-
graphic groups enough as to explain wage gaps. We nd that these alternative
formulations are problematic. We performed further robustness checks not re-
ported. We nd that our main results are robust to the following alternatives.
(i) dierent period of analysis; (ii) full time versus part time.
5.1 No statistical discrimination
The benchmark model assumes µ = 1, or full statistical discrimination (SD).
In this section, we report results for an alternative calibration strategy with
no statistical discrimination (NSD) where µ is set to be 0. This calibration
strategy implies that rms are not able to statistically discriminate workers
based on group-specic job separation probabilities, πEN and πEU . Instead,
the calibration assumes that rms and workers only observe a common set of
job separation rates, aected only by education, age and experience, but not
by demographic indicators. For convenience, we choose job separation rates of
White males as the common rates just because White males is the reference
group utilized in other parts of the paper, say when comparing wage gaps. The
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Table 5: Decomposition Race/Ethnic Gaps
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Average gap (weighted) 1.32 1.8% ‐0.6% 1.2% ‐1.2% 7.6% ‐0.4% 1.8% ‐1.3% 4.34
Explained gap 1.23 1.6% ‐0.5% 1.1% ‐1.1% 6.6% ‐0.2% 1.7% ‐1.2% 4.04
Initial human capital (y ) 0.35 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.96
Matching productivity (A ) 0.00 ‐0.2% 0.1% ‐0.1% 0.1% ‐0.2% 0.1% ‐0.8% 0.0% 0.08
Search‐effort nonpartcipans () ‐0.10 ‐1.5% 0.0% ‐1.5% 1.5% 1.4% ‐2.0% 0.5% ‐1.6% ‐0.81
Returns to experience (r) 0.52 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% ‐0.2% 1.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 1.79
Separation rate to Unempl. (EU) 0.12 0.7% ‐0.4% 0.3% ‐0.3% 0.9% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.49
Separation rate to Non‐p. (EN) 0.31 2.4% ‐0.1% 2.3% ‐2.3% 2.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.2% 1.54
Flow Unempl. To Non‐p.  (UN) 0.02 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% ‐0.1% ‐0.4% ‐0.2% ‐0.2% ‐0.1% 0.03
Flow Non‐p. to Unempl. (UN) ‐0.01 ‐0.1% ‐0.2% ‐0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% ‐0.06
Initial distribution of pop. (m0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
 0.33 0.01 0.00 0.01 ‐0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.78
Wage Empl Unemp Part Non‐Par 
U N UE NE W
Initial human capital (y) 24.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7%
Returns to experience (r) 36.1% 4.5% 4.8% 3.7% 3.7% 22.1% ‐14.7% 17.4% ‐8.9% 31.0%
Matching productivity (A ) 0.3% ‐2.9% ‐7.1% ‐1.7% ‐1.7% ‐2.3% ‐3.2% ‐21.5% 0.5% 1.4%
Search‐effort nonpartcipants () ‐6.7% ‐29.2% ‐2.9% ‐30.7% ‐30.7% 17.4% 46.7% 13.5% 73.8% ‐14.0%
To unemploymentEU) 8.5% 13.4% 36.9% 6.7% 6.7% 11.7% ‐7.8% 9.4% ‐4.9% 8.5%
To nonparticipationEN) 22.0% 47.0% 13.8% 47.5% 47.5% 37.4% ‐21.4% 28.8% ‐7.9% 26.7%
UN 1.2% ‐0.2% ‐13.4% 2.5% 2.5% ‐5.6% 4.8% ‐5.1% 3.0% 0.5%
NU ‐0.4% ‐1.9% 20.3% ‐6.4% ‐6.4% 3.5% ‐1.2% 4.2% ‐0.6% ‐1.0%
m0 0.3% 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%
sum absolute contributions 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Contribution 22.7% 13.8% 11.8% 12.7% 12.7% 53.9% ‐38.8% 41.3% ‐24.9% 30.8%
As share of d 74.4% 22.9% 23.2% 23.4% 23.4% 109.8% 132.7% 108.1% 193.1% 87.5%
Others
Statistical discrimination
Table 5: Race/Ethnic Gaps: Labor Market Gaps Relative to Whites of same educational group 2016
Contributions
Human Capital
Separation rates (d)
Matching Efficiency
results in this section are robust to selecting other natural reference groups,
such as population averages by age, experience and education.21
Figure 10 shows human capitals and matching productivities of the NSD
model relative to the SD model for various demographic groups over the life-
cycle. A salient feature of these graphs is that the NSD model requires sig-
nicantly lower human capitals, relative to White males, and lower matching
eciencies than the SD model. The percentage required drop in matching ef-
ciency is larger and more persistent over the life-cycle than the required drop
in human capitals. The large drop in matching eciencies of all groups relative
to White males suggests that reducing the role for statistical discrimination,
by setting µ = 0, increases the potential for taste based discrimination (TBD).
In particular, regarding gender and race discrimination, the SD model suggests
a relatively small potential role for TBD since matching eciencies are only
slightly lower for White females and Black males relative to White males. But
the NSD model requires signicantly lower matching eciencies for these two
groups, suggesting a larger potential role for TBD.
The direct eect of eliminating SD is to increase the value of matches with
21Using average probabilities would be more transparent exercise because it would be a
mean preserving change in destruction rates.
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Figure 10: Human capital proles: No-statistical discrimination (NSD, µ = 0)
relative to Statistical Discrimination (SD, µ = 1).
higher break probabilities than White males, such as women or Black males, in-
creasing job posting and improving nding rates for those groups. To counteract
this eect and thus match the observed nding rates, the NSD model requires
lower matching eciencies for those groups. Eliminating SD would also tend to
increase wages of those same groups since their match surpluses increase when
separation rates fall to equate White male rates. To oset this eect, and thus
match observed wages, the NSD model requires lower human capital stocks for
those groups. Lower human capitals partly reduce match surpluses and discour-
age job posting, but the direct eect of lower separation rates dominates making
necessary for the NSD model to lower matching eciencies signicantly.
These exercises show the diculties that a pure human capital model has to
jointly explain the evidence on wages and nding rates. In other words, a model
free of any type of discrimination in the labor market, beyond what is embodied
in the human capital of the worker, would have diculties matching the data.
The results also highlights the importance of utilizing a general equilibrium
model rather a partial equilibrium one.
Finally, Figure 10 shows the labor market tightnesses rates for dierent
groups relative to White males rates for the SD and NSD models. Tightnesses
are closer to each other between dierent groups in the NSD model, since rms
cannot treat workers dierently, or distinguish among workers, based on their
match break probabilities. The average labor market tightness rate of White
males to Black males is 1.12 is the NSD model. This small gaps is problematic
for the NSD model since the evidence suggests a larger gap in the number of
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Figure 11: Labor market tightnesses for the unemployed relative to an aver-
age White male for the statistical discrimination model (µ = 1) and the No-
statistical discrimination model (µ = 0).
vacancies per unemployed worker. In particular, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) nds that Whites receive 50% higher call backs per applications than
Blacks. This suggests also a 50% higher ratio of eective vacancy posting for
Whites than Blacks. The NSD model, which turns out to require signicant
TBD to match the data, does not produce nearly enough gap in the vacancy
gap. In contrast, SD model generates a job posting vacancies of 1.5, consistent
with the ndings of Bertrand and Mullainathan. For this reason, we chose the
SD model as the benchmark model.
5.2 Calibrated outside options
The benchmark model calibrated human capital stocks using equation (24) by
assuming a common replacement rate, γ (x) , for all groups. We now report
results for an alternative calibration that assumes a common human capital
function, and uses (24) to backup groups specic series of γ (x). The non-
market value of human capital is then given by γ (x)h(x), a value that would
allow the model to match observed wage rates. The common human capital
function used is the one calibrated for White males in the benchmark model.
The function allows the initial human capital and the returns to experience to
depend on skill level.
Figure 12 shows the calibrated series of γ (x) for various groups. It is imme-
diately clear the limitations of a model that relies on dierential outside options
as way to explain wage dierentials. The most salient limitation is that it would
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Figure 12: Outside option (as proportion of human capital) required to explain
wage gaps.
require the human capitals of most groups to have zero or a negative value out-
side the labor market for a signicant part of life-cycle. For example, all female
groups would be required to have a negative outside option by age 35 to 40.
Two other questionable implications are that (i) White males would have lower
entering levels of human capitals than all other groups; and (ii) White and Asian
females would have an increasingly better outside option than WM early over
the life cycle.
6 Relation to the literature
Our model related to the literature of life-cycle search models with human cap-
ital such as Hairault et. al. (2007), Cheron et. al. (2013), Menzio et al.
(2016) and Bowlus and Liu (2014). Barnichon and Figura (2015) and Hall and
Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) also study matching eciency under heterogeneity and
segmented markets. But while they focus on aggregate business cycle properties,
our focus is on life-cycle and demographic features.
Our paper relates to the large and active literature on labor market dispar-
ities between gender and race, and more specically on the literature on labor
market discrimination (see literature reviews in Lang and Lehmann 2012 and
Blau and Kahn 2017) and on the impacts of career breaks on labor market out-
comes. Literature on discrimination using dynamic, structural approaches are
fairly limited. The closest paper to ours is by Gayle and Golan (2012), who
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study gender discrimination and a gender wage gap by building a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model. They nd that dierences in labor market experience
are the most important channel to explain gender wage gap over the life cycle,
and statistical discrimination can also explain a signicant fraction of the gap.
Our paper diers from theirs as we not only study the gender wage gap and
discrimination, but a wider group of people. Also, we study specically labor
market with frictions to be able to study simultaneously not on wage disparities,
but also disparities in other labor market outcomes. There exists a very recent
literature on identifying the causal impacts of parenthood on gender wage gaps
(Angelov, Johansson, & Lindahl 2016, Chung et. al. 2017, Kleven, Landais,
& Sogaard 2018, Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2017), and the results show
consistently large and long term impacts of parenthood on the increase in the
wage gaps. More generally, there is a literature on the impacts on unemploy-
ment spells on earnings. For example, Guvenen et. al. (2017) found that
spending one year or more out of work caused long-term losses of earnings for
U.S. male workers compared to workers who stayed employed. Our paper builds
on these empirical ndings by modeling the relation between non employment
periods and human capital growth, and then use the general equilibrium model
to assess how big fraction of the negative impacts of the nonworking periods
are arising from the discriminatory behavior of the rms. Our theory relates
to literature on search models with human capital growth. There are earlier
papers that study human capital and wage growth in search frameworks. The
literature usually study the role of human capital investment (either general or
rm-specic) versus on-the-job search on the wage growth. Flinn et. al. (2017)
study how rms and workers choose to invest in general and rm-specic human
capital in a partial and general equilibrium search model, and how much can
wage growth of the workers be explained by investment in human capital ver-
sus searching for new, more productive employment opportunities. They link
their results with Mincer equation and nd decreasing returns to investment
in both types of human capital. Burdett et. al. (2011) also build a search
model with general human capital accumulation and on-the-job search to inves-
tigate the role of each of these channels in human capital growth in the steady
state, but in their model, general human capital accumulates through learning-
by-doing. They also connect their results with Mincer equation to see if their
model generates reasonable connection with Mincer literature. However, they
assume constant returns to experience, which diers with typical decreasing re-
turns in experience in Mincer equations. Bagger et. al. (2014) build a model
along the same lines as Burdett et. al. (2014), but allow for an employee and
an employer heterogeneity and productivity shocks, and they estimate the life
cycle wage growth patterns. Our paper also assumes human capital accumula-
tion through learning-by-doing, but the main dierence in our framework is that
we also require our model to generate realistic employment, unemployment and
non-participation outcomes over the life cycle, in addition to wage outcomes.
These other labor market outcomes are tightly linked with the wage outcomes
through human capital accumulation and through the wage bargaining between
a worker and a rm. We also study quantitatively how well our framework can
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explain race and gender dierences in all these labor market outcomes.
This paper also combines the literature on wage gaps with the growing lit-
erature on transition ows and their importance on unemployment and partici-
pation rates of workers (Choi et.al 2014, Elsby et. al. 2015, Kroft et. al. 2016,
Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers 2016) by studying how much gender and race
dierences in ow probabilities can explain dierences in wage growth patterns
and other labor market outcomes. This paper also relates to the literature on
nite life-cycle search models (Cheron, Hairault, and Langot 2013, Esteban-
Pretel and Fujimoto 2014, Fujimoto 2013, Hairault, Cheron, and Langot 2007,
Bowlus and Liu 2014, Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers 2016) by studying wage
growth and the gender and race wage gaps in a nite life-cycle environment with
human capital growth due to experience. Finally, Rauh and Vallardes-Esteban
2018 study the wage and employment gaps among Blacks and White males in
a model with endogenous human capital and exogenous separation rates. They
nd a similar for separation rates as we do. Our focus is more comprehensive,
and unemployment rates are endogenous in our environment which allows us to
discuss issues of statistical and taste based discrimination.
7 Concluding comments
The U.S. labor market is becoming increasingly diverse. At the same time,
there are persistent dierences in labor market outcomes, such as in wages or
unemployment rates, between demographic groups. This paper seeks to un-
derstand the sources of unequal labor market outcomes through the lenses of
the canonical labor market model: the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP)
model. We introduce standard elements into the model to make it amenable
for our exercise: (i) human capital accumulates through learning-by-doing; (ii)
workers can be nonparticipants, in addition to employed or unemployed; and
(iii) labor markets are segmented.
In the spirit of Chari et. al. (2007), we reverse-engineered the wedges needed
for the model to be able to exactly match observed series of wages and nding
rates over the life-cycle for a comprehensive set of demographic groups. We
argue that these wedges provide useful guidance about the underlying sources
of labor market disparities and for future research. We selected the DMP model
for two main reasons. First, there are persistent dierences in the rates of unem-
ployment among demographic groups. The DMP model is the canonical model
of unemployment and therefore the natural candidate for our accounting exer-
cise. Second, the DMP provides a unied explanation for labor market variables,
such as wages, employment, unemployment, and labor market participation, all
of which vary systematically among demographic groups.
We nd that wedges in three set of parameters are responsible for most of
the labor market disparities: gaps in initial human capital (y), in return to
experience (r), and in the separation rate to non-participation (πEN ). The
importance of each of these wedges varies depending on the specic gap, but
the inuence of each is notable whether we look at skill, gender, or racial gaps.
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While human capital wedges are the most important factors explaining the
gaps in wages, wedges in parameters determining the long-term value of the
match, r and πEN , can explain the majority of gaps in job-nding rates. We
also nd that a major fraction of the impact through match break probability,
πEN , comes through discrimination channel, emphasizing the role of statistical
discrimination in labor market gaps. Wedges in matching eciencies turned out
to be quantitatively secondary. While we found quite large variation in matching
eciencies between individual groups, some minority groups do better compared
to the baseline groups while some do worse, and at the aggregate level those
eects cancel out. This result suggests that taste-based discrimination in hiring
is not a major explanatory variable of labor market gaps.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) provide compelling evidence that race
matters for hiring decisions. Everything else the same, Whites received around
50%more callbacks for interviews in their eld experiment. What is the source of
this dierence? Our exercise sheds some light. According to our model, there are
three set of reasons why some individuals are more employable than others: (i)
higher human capital; (ii) prejudice in hiring; and (iii) statistical discrimination.
Our quantitative exercise suggests that human capital dierences, in particular
in returns to experience, and statistical discrimination explains most of the gap.
Prejudice in hiring is of secondary importance.
Our results about the importance of statistical discrimination are consistent
with a large body of empirical literature (see for example Agan & Starr 2017,
Altonji & Pierret 2001, Ayres and Siegelman 1995, Bohren, Haggag, Imas, &
Pope 2019, List 2004, and Zussman 2013) that nd evidence on discrimina-
tion in various markets, which is statistical in nature. The reason why returns
to experience and job destruction rates play such an important role in wages,
employment, and earnings, has to do with the search friction: hiring a worker
requires rm to incur in a x cost for the chance to start a long-term relation-
ship. Firms are more willing to hire workers with larger surpluses, although in
equilibrium rms make no prots as more entry reduces the change of a suc-
cessful hire. Workers with higher returns to experience and lower separation
rates produce a higher expected surplus, which induce more job posting, higher
nding rates, a better bargaining position, and better wages during bargaining.
The natural next step in this research is to endogenize returns to experience
and hazard rates. This step would require to enrich the model considerably,
or to focus on a more narrow set of demographic groups, as is standard in the
literature.
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A Proof of proposition 1
Using the denitions of surpluses given in (17), equations (3), (4) and (10) can
be written as,
Θ (x)SEU (x) = h (x)− w(x) + β(1− πEU (x)− πEN (x))Θ (x)SEU (x′), (25)
κ (x) = βA (x) θ (x)
−α
Θ (x)SiEU (e, a+ 1), (26)
where x′ = (e+ 1, a+ 1, Ē, i). Moreover, equations (6) and (7) read:
E(x) = w(x) + β [E(x′)− πEU (x)SEU (x′)− πEN (x)SEN (x′)] ; (27)
U(x) = cUi (e, a) + β
[
Ui(e, a+ 1) + f
U
i (e, a)S
i
EU (e, a+ 1) + π̄UN (x)S
i
NU (e, a+ 1)
]
= cUi (e, a) + β
[
U(x′)−∆U(x′) + fUi (e, a)SEU (e, a+ 1)
+π̄UN (x)SNU (e, a+ 1)
]
;
Substracting the second equation from the rst one:
SEU (x) = w(x)− cUi (e, a) +
β
[
(1− πEU (x))SEU (x′) + ∆U (x′)− fUi (e, a)SiEU (e, a+ 1)
−πEN (x)SEN (x′)− π̄UN (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
]
or
SEU (x) = w(x)− cUi (e, a) + βE
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]
(28)
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where E
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]
is the expected surplus at age a + 1 of an employed
worker in state (e, a+ 1). It is dened as:
E
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]
=
[
(1− πEU (x))SEU (x′)− πEN (x)SEN (x′)− π̄UN (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
−fUi (e, a)SiEU (e, a+ 1) + ∆U (x′)
]
Similarly, rewrite (8) as:
N(x) = cNi (e, a) + β
[
Ni(e, a+ 1) + f
N
i (e, a)S
i
EN (e, a+ 1) + π̄NU (x)S
i
UN (e, a+ 1)
]
= cNi (e, a) + β
[
N(x′)−∆N(x′) + fNi (e, a)SiEN (e, a+ 1)− π̄NU (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
]
.
Substracting this equation from (27):
SEN (x) = w(x)− cNi (e, a) +
β
[
SEN (x
′) + ∆N (x′)− fNi (e, a)SiEN (e, a+ 1)
−πEU (x)SEU (x′)− πEN (x)SEN (x′) + π̄NU (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
]
or
SEN (x) = w(x)− cNi (e, a) + βE
[
S̃iEN (e, a+ 1)
]
(29)
where
E
[
S̃iEN (e, a+ 1)
]
=
[
(1− πEU (x))SEN (x′)− fNi (e, a)SiEN (e, a+ 1)
−πEU (x)SEU (x′) + π̄NU (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1) + ∆N (x′)
]
is the expected value of the future surplus, at a+1, of an employed worker with
state (e, a+ 1).
Equations (3), (25), (26), (28) and (29) form a system of ve equations in
four unknowns: that can be solved for each (i, e, a) state given future values
of those same variables: {J(x), SEU (x), θs (x) , w(x), SEN (x)}(i,e,a). Equation
(26) can be used to directly solve for θ (x) as a function of Ji (e, a+ 1) . To solve
for w(x), use (25) and (28) to obtain:
Θ(x)
[
w(x)− cUi (e, a) + βE
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]]
= h (x)− w(x) + β [(1− πEU (x)− πEN (x))Θ (x)SEU (x′)] .
Solving for w(x) gives
w(x) =
h (x) + Θ (x) cUi (e, a) + βΘ (x) Ω (x)
1 + Θ (x)
.
where Ω (x) = (1−πEU (x)−πEN (x))SEU (x′)−E
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]
. Notice that
Ω (x)
= (1− πEU (x)− πEN (x))SEU (x′)− E
[
S̃iEU (e, a+ 1)
]
= (1− πEU (x)− πEN (x))SEU (x′)− (1− πEU (x))SEU (x′) + πEN (x)SEN (x′)
+π̄UN (x)S
i
NU (e, a+ 1) + f
U
i (e, a)S
i
EU (e, a+ 1)−∆U (x′)
54
or
Ω (x) = πEN (x) [SEN (x
′)− SEU (x′)] + π̄UN (x)SiNU (e, a+ 1)
+fUi (e, a)S
i
EU (e, a+ 1)−∆U (x′) .
B Identication and calibration strategy
The calibration uses average wages and average job-nding rates at each age
to calibrate parameters human capital and matching eciency parameters at
each age and for each demographic group. The calibration of the key parametes
Ai (a) ,ψi(a), ri (a) and yi come from an iteration process that start with an
initial guess of msi (e, a) and yi that is recursively revised until convergence.
Dene average wages, average human capital, average outside consumption and
average nding rates at age a as:
wi(a) =
∑
em
E
i (e, a)wi(e, a)∑
em
E
i (e, aR)
(30)
hi(a) =
∑
em
E
i (e, a)hi(e, a)∑
em
E
i (e, aR)
(31)
ci(a) =
∑
em
E
i (e, a) c̄
U
i (e, a)∑
em
E
i (e, aR)
(32)
f (a, U, i) =
∑
em
U
i (e, a) f
(
e, a, Ū , i
)∑
em
U
i (e, a)
; (33)
f (a,N, i) =
∑
em
N
i (e, a) f
(
e, a, N̄ , i
)∑
em
N
i (e, a)
. (34)
B.1 Calibration for a = aR − 1
We are now ready to describe the benchmark calibration of human capital pa-
rameters and matching productivities. The reverse enginiering start backwards,
from aR − 1. According to (30), (13), (31) and (32) the average wage at age
aR − 1 satises
wi(aR − 1) =
∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1)wi(e, aR − 1)∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1)
=
∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1)
[hi(e,aR−1)+Θi(a)(cUi (e,aR−1)−β∆Ri(e+1,aR))]
1+Θi(a)∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1)
=
hi(aR − 1) + Θi (a) [ci (aR − 1)− β∆Ri (aR)]
1 + Θi (a)
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where
∆Ri (aR) =
∑
em
E
i (e, a) ∆Ri (e+ 1, aR)∑
em
E
i (e, aR)
(35)
Given data for wi(aR − 1), this expression could be used to solve for hi(aR − 1)
as:
hi(aR− 1) = wi(aR− 1) (1 + Θi (a))−Θi (a)
(
cUi (aR − 1)− β∆Ri (aR)
)
. (36)
The calculated hi(aR − 1) should be equal to the analytical average human
capital obtained from the assumed functional form hi(e, a) =yiexp(ri(a)e) across
experiences at age a = aR−1. This provides the following equation used to solve
for ri(aR − 1):
hi(aR − 1) = yi
∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1) exp(ri(aR − 1)e)∑
em
E
i (e, aR − 1)
(37)
The calibrated value of ri(aR − 1) is then used to calculate human capitals
hi(e, aR − 1) and wages, not just average wages, according to (13) as:
wi(e, aR−1) =
1
1 + Θi (a)
[
hi (e, aR − 1) + Θi (a)
(
cUi (e, aR − 1)− β∆Ri (e+ 1aR)
)]
.
These wages can then be plugged into (3), (6), and (7) to nd Ji(e, aR − 1),
Ei(e, aR − 1), Ui(e, aR − 1), Ni(e, aR − 1) as well as the surpluses dened by
(17) for a = aR − 1.
B.2 Calibration for a < aR − 1.
Given the values of Ji(e, a+ 1), average job-nding rates for age a can be found
using (23), (33) and (34). In particular,
f (a, U, i) = Ai (a)
1
α
∑
em
U
i (e, a) (βJi(e, a+ 1)/κi (e, a))
1−α
α∑
em
U
i (e, a)
or solving for Ai(a):
Ai (a, U) = Ai(a) =
[
f
(
a, Ū , i
)∑
em
U
i (e, a)∑
em
U
i (e, a) (βJi(e, a+ 1)/κi (e, a))
1−α
α
]α
Similarly,
Ai (a,N) = ψi(a)Ai(a) =
[
f
(
a, N̄ , i
)∑
em
N
i (e, a)∑
em
N
i (e, a) (βJi(e, a+ 1)/κi (e, a))
1−α
α
]α
.
These two expressions provide the calibrated values of Ai (a) and ψi(a) given
data on average values of nding rates for the unemployed and the nonpartici-
pants. These formulas are valid for all ages. Given these parametric values then
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job-nding rates for all e, not just on average, f (e, a, U, i) and f (e, a,N, i) using
(20). One can the use these job-nding rates as well as the surpluses already
obtained for a + 1 to calculate W (x) as dened by (21). Next, dene WEi (a)
as:
ΩEi (a) =
∑
em
E
i (e, a) Ω(e, a, E, i)∑
em
E
i (e, a)
.
According to (18), average wages satisfy:
wi(a) =
1
1 + Θi (a)
∑
e
mEi (e, a)∑
em
E
i (e, a)
[
hi (e, a) +
Θi (a)
(
cUi + βΩ
E
i (e, a)
) ]
=
1
1 + Θi (a)
[
hi (a) + Θi (a)
(
cUi + βΩ
E
i (a)
)]
Given data for wi(a) this expression could be used to solve for hi(a) as:
hi (a) = wi(a) (1 + Θi (a))−Θi (a)
(
cUi + βΩ
E
i (a)
)
. (38)
The calculated sequence of hi (a) should be equal to the analytical average
human capital obtained from the assumed functional form hi(e, a) =yiexp(ri(a)e).
This provides the following set of equations that are used to solve for yi and
ri(a):
hi(0) = yi, hi(a) = yi
∑
em
E
i (e, a) exp(ri(a)e)∑
em
E
i (e, a)
(39)
Given yi and ri(a), then hi(e, a) =yiexp(ri(a)e) can be obtained for all e as well
as wages, not just average wages, according to (18). Wages can then be plugged
into (3), (6), (7) and (8) to nd Ji(e, a), Ei(e, a), Ui(e, a), Ni(e, a). as well as
the surpluses dened by (17) for a.
The process just described delivers full sequences of value functions, human
capitals, wages and nding rates for all (e,a,i,s). The nding rates can then
be used along with other exogenous ows to update the guessed sequence of
msi (e, a) using (11) and (12).
C Detailed calibration results
C.1 Reverse-engineered human capital proles for college
and non-college workers
We next describe the dierences in human capital proles between dierent ed-
ucation groups. Figure 13 shows, not surprisingly, that non-skilled groups have
lower starting levels and growth rates of human capital compared to skilled.
Also, human capital levels vary less between gender and race for non-skilled
compared to skilled. Within race/ethnicity, males have higher levels of human
capital over the life cycle for both skilled and non-skilled compared to females.
Males also have steeper growth proles of human capital: while for most male
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Figure 13: Wage and human capital proles over the life cycle for college and
non-college workers, relative to the wage of 25 year old average White male.
groups human capital is strictly increasing over time, White and Hispanic fe-
males face a stagnating human capital growth between ages 35 and 50. The
human capital of skilled Black females follows a similar growth prole than
males  it keeps increasing over the whole life cycle. Stagnating human capital
growth for certain female groups are likely related to career breaks: as many
women leave the labor market during prime working ages due to family reasons,
the average returns to experience for those groups is lower.
Within gender and education level, we also nd fairly large dierences in
human capital proles for dierent races/ethnicities, which increase over the
life cycle. For non-skilled, White males and females have higher human capital
levels over the whole life cycle compared to other races. For skilled, Asian
males have the highest human capital until age 55, when White males take the
lead. Black and Hispanic males have signicantly lower human capital levels
compared to Asian and White males, Hispanics having somewhat higher human
capital compared to Black males. Skilled Asian females have the highest human
capital over the life cycle compared to other females groups, followed by White
females. Again, Black and Hispanic females have similar human capital levels
over the life cycle, but signicantly lower compared to Asian and White females.
The racial gaps in human capital are however smaller for women than for men.
Figure 14 shows specically the reverse-engineered returns to experience
(ri(a)) for both college and non-college workers. Returns to experiences gaps
determine the gaps in the human capital growth rates. College-educated workers
have higher ri(a) than non-college educated, as can be seen in the human capital
proles. Returns to experience seem to decrease for older workers, and this
pattern is especially true for college-educated groups. Returns to experience
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Figure 14: Returns to experience for skilled and non-skilled.
within non-college educated are the highest for White males and females followed
by other male groups and Black females. In general, males have higher returns
to experiences than females within race / ethnicity.
Figure 15 shows the wage-to-human capital proles for dierent demographic
groups, which represent the gross prots of rms hiring each demographic group.
Gross-prots for a rm are higher for demographic groups who have lower long-
time value of the match. The idea is that rms will attempt to recover their
vacancy posting costs, and if the long-term value of the match is low, rms are
requiring a higher share of the worker's human capital at the current period to
cover the cost. Gross-prots have u-shape for many groups: required prots are
higher for younger workers, decreased for the prime-age workers, and then start
increasing again towards the retirement. There is also gender and racial varia-
tion in the gross-prots for both non-college and college workers. Firms require
lower gross-prots from males withing race, as their long-term value for a rm
is likely to be higher. Only exception is Blacks, for whom the gross-prots for
Black males are similar or even higher than for Black females. Within unskilled
workers, Asian and especially Hispanic males have the lowest gross prots, fol-
lowed by Whites, while the gross-prots for Black males are the highest. For
females under age 45, Asians have the lowest gross prots, while other female
groups have fairly similar levels, but after age 45 the gross-prots for all female
groups converge. The patterns for college-educated females is very dierent:
Asian females are now the group with notably higher gross-prots. It is likely
arising from the fact that they have very high human capital and as the hiring
costs are assumed to be increasing with a worker's human capital, the costs of
hiring these workers are high. That combined with a relatively low long-term
value of the match leads to very high gross prots. Hispanic females have the
second highest gross prots followed by Whites, and Black college-educated fe-
males have the lowest gross-prots. Among males, Black males again have the
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Figure 15: Gross-prots per worker, skilled and non-skilled.
highest gross prots. The gross-prots of White and Hispanics males are at the
similar levels over the life cycle. For Asian males, they rst have as high or
even higher gross-prots than Black males, but after age 45 they converge to
the ones of Hispanic and White males.
C.2 Reverse-engineered matching eciencies for college
and non-college workers
In general, matching eciencies are higher for non-college groups than college
groups (Figure 16). Non-college groups have more variation in the matching
eciencies compared to college groups. Also, the As of non-skilled males are
decreasing relatively more with age compared to women and skilled men, which
could reect the fact that non-skilled males are more likely to be working in
occupations requiring physical labor and aging is mattering more in these oc-
cupations.
Similarly as with human capital, males tend to have higher matching pro-
ductivities within race and education compared to females. This is especially
pronounced for non-skilled and younger workers. It is likely that younger female
workers with lower education may be presumed less attached to labor market
which then aect their job nding rate. Within skilled groups, the gender gap
in matching eciency for Blacks and Whites is quite small, and White females
actually have a higher matching eciency compared to White males after age
40. Young skilled Asians have the widest gender gap compared to other skilled
groups, Asian women between ages 25 and 40 having signicantly weaker match-
ing eciency. This gap, however, closes towards the end of the life cycle. Skilled
Hispanics also have wider gender gap compared to Blacks and Whites, but more
modest than unskilled Hispanics.
When it comes to racial/ethnic dierences in matching eciencies, Hispanics
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Figure 16: job-nding rates for unemployed and matching eciencies over the
life cycle for college and non-college workers.
tend to do better in almost all gender-education groups: Hispanic males have the
highest matching eciencies among both skilled and non-skilled males, while the
same is true for non-skilled Hispanic females. Within non-skilled females and
males, Hispanics are followed by Asians and Whites, Blacks coming last. When
it comes to skilled males, the other three races have fairly similar matching
eciencies over the life cycle. Among skilled females, White females have the
highest matching eciencies over the whole life cycle followed by Hispanics and
Blacks. As mentioned before, skilled Asian females have the lowest matching
eciency early in life but it starts to catch up with the ones of Hispanics and
Blacks after age 40.
Figure 17 presents the reverse-engineered search eort of nonparticipants for
dierent groups. The identication assumption in the calibration was that, we
assume that the matching eciencies, A, are the same for unemployed and non-
participants, and that the search eort of unemployed is always 1. Thus, ψN̄i (a)
captures the dierences in job-nding rates between unemployed and nonpartic-
ipants, for otherwise similar workers. The interpretation is that nonparticipants
are typically less attached to labor force for various reasons, which is reected
in the lower job nding rate of nonparticipants and is captured by the lower
search eort.
The most obvious trend in search eorts over the life cycle is that the search
eort is the highest for young workers and starts decreasing for the majority
of the groups with age. This is not a surprising result since older workers are
likely to be less attached to the labor force for various reasons: older workers are
more likely to have issues related to health aecting their willingness to search
for work and they may also be more discouraged to look for work because the
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Figure 17: Search eort, ψN̄i (a), of nonparticipants, skilled and non-skilled.
probability of nding a job decreases with age.
College-educated have higher search eort compared to non-college educated
for all the other races/ethnicities except Asians. For Asians, the search eor for
skilled and unskilled are quite similar, but the ordering varies over the life. There
is also a gender gap in search eort for all the other groups except unskilled
Blacks, but the gender gap decreases or closes after age 40. The lower search
eort of females is thus most likely related to child-rearing responsibilities. The
search eort for unskilled Black males and females are almost equal, which either
reects that the search eor of black females is atypically high, the search eort
of black males is atypically low, or a combination of both, compared to other
gender groups. This result likely reects the fact that Blacks are less likely to
be married (Source: US Census) and Black women are more likely to be single-
mothers compared to other races, which then shows up as a higher attachment
to labor force and a higher search eort of Black females. While Blacks have
the lowest gender gap also among skilled, the highest gender gaps are among
Asians and Hispanics.
Racial dierences in search eort vary between gender. While Asian males
have the highest search eort within each education level, followed by Hispanics
and Blacks, Black females have the highest search eort among females. Only
for unskilled females, Asian and Hispanic females have higher search eort after
age 40 than unskilled Black females. Whites have always the lowest search eort
within a gender-education group.
Figures 18, 19, and 20 present the following estimated labor market ows:
transition ows for average, as well as for the college and non-college workers
between unemployment and non-participation, πiUN , π
i
NU , and job destruction
rates for the college and non-college workers, πiEU , π
i
EN .
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Figure 18: Average transition ows between non-participation and unemploy-
ment (CPS 1998-2018).
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Figure 19: Job destruction rates to unemployment and non-participation for
college and non-college workers (CPS 1998-2018).
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Figure 20: Transition ows between non-participation and unemployment for
college and non-college workers (CPS 1998-2018).
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